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MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

TITLE: DOMESTIC CATASTROPHES FLOW THROUGH SIX DISTINCT PHASES: AN
ANALYSIS OF THE LOS ANGELES RIOTS OF 1992 AND HURRICANE KATRINA IN
2005

SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTERS OF MILITARY STUDIES

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LCDR Jonathan D. Theel, USCG

LCDR Theel grew up in Sioux Falls, South Dakota, and reported to the U. S. Coast Guard Academy in July 1992, where he tasted saltwater for the first time. In May 1996, he graduated with a Bachelor of Science in Marine and Environmental Science (with honors).

He headed south to Miami, Florida, for his first assignment as Deck Watch Officer aboard USCGC VALIANT. Towards the end of his tour in 1998, he married the former Anne Jeffcoat also from Sioux Falls, South Dakota.

After patrolling the Caribbean for two years, he became the Officer-in-Charge (OIC) of Law Enforcement Detachment (LEDET) 5F based out of Atlantic Beach, North Carolina. He spent another two years in the Caribbean pursuing drug traffickers aboard U.S. and Allied naval vessels. During his last few months, he went to Bahrain to serve as the assistant Coast Guard liaison officer to the U. S. Naval Forces Central Command during Operation Southern Watch while also acting as OIC of the temporarily assigned LEDET.

In 2000, he entered the intelligence community at the National Drug Intelligence Center in Johnstown, Pennsylvania, and was the only Coast Guard member in its Strategic Analysis section. Shortly after reporting, his daughter, Alexandria Marie, was born.

After one year, he was offered an excellent opportunity to transfer to the Coast Guard Personnel Command, Officer Personnel Management, to become the Promotions Branch Chief. During this “much-harder-than-anticipated” tour, he went to night school and graduated with a Master of Science in Environmental Engineering (with honors) from Johns Hopkins University.

His next assignment was as Deputy Commander, Group Grand Haven, Michigan, and he remained as Deputy through its transition to Sector Field Office Grand Haven. His son, Orion Thomas, entered the family in 2005.

On 26 May 2006, he assumed command of Maritime Safety and Security Team Miami. His team earned the esteemed Sumner I. Kimball award for excellence, and he served as the Patrol Commander during the historic 54th Presidential Inauguration of Barack Obama.

During the summer of 2009, he reported to the Marine Corps Command and Staff College in Quantico, Virginia, as the sole U.S. Coast Guard student for the Class of 2010. His follow-on assignment is to Coast Guard Headquarters as the Coast Guard’s Advanced Interdiction Program Manager (CG-532).

Lieutenant Commander Theel’s personal awards include the Coast Guard Meritorious Service Medal (with “Operational” device), two Coast Guard Commendation Medals (with “Operational” device), a Navy and Marine Corps Commendation Medal, and a Commandant’s Letter of Commendation (with “Operational” device).

Executive Summary

Title: Domestic Catastrophes Flow Through Six Distinct Phases: An Analysis of the Los Angeles Riots of 1992 and Hurricane Katrina in 2005.

Author: Lieutenant Commander Jonathan D. Theel, United States Coast Guard

Thesis: Analyzing the Los Angeles Riots of 1992 and Hurricane Katrina in 2005 demonstrate the specific phases of a catastrophe and suggest improvements for future responses.

Discussion: A gang-related altercation in 1992 and breached levees in 2005 sparked two diverse catastrophes bracketing the creation of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). However, each followed a similar pattern categorized into six distinct phases: Buildup, Chaos, Reaction, Federal Planning, National Response, and Recovery. The first three encompassed events at the local level and the last three accounted for Federal actions.

Legal and historical precedence originated with the U.S. Constitution, and initial federal involvement during catastrophes was limited. However, it expanded significantly following the Great Depression. The 9/11 terrorist attacks resulted in the establishment of DHS and a new strategic approach to domestic catastrophes.

Evaluating the Los Angeles Riots of 1992 and Hurricane Katrina during the first three phases revealed how a combination of stressors sparked a trigger event, which resulted in a loss of the Rule of Law. The chaos that followed overwhelmed the local response system. During the Reaction Phase, the National Guard supplied a vital surge capacity to the State and local responders. Federal support assisted State and local efforts as part of a national response to the catastrophic event. Although the national response to the Los Angeles Riots of 1992 hindered the response, it was imperative following Hurricane Katrina. Regardless of the effectiveness of the national response, the only way to stabilize the situation and return the Rule of Law to the area was by invoking the military as part of the Federal response.

Conclusion: The federal government is indeed the right entity to respond to a catastrophe and the military is a critical part of its national response. Consequently, state and local governments will increase their dependence upon the federal government to survive and recover from a catastrophe. The Los Angeles Riots of 1992 and Hurricane Katrina not only demonstrate the specific phases of a catastrophe, but also suggest improvements for future responses. In addition, they show how national power can be used domestically.

Table of Contents

Biography	i
Executive Summary	ii
Table of Contents	iii
Introduction	1
Terminology	1
Historical Context	2
Analyzing the Six Phases of a Catastrophe	4
Buildup Phase	4
Chaos Phase	7
Reaction Phase	8
Federal Planning Phase	12
National Response Phase	13
Recovery Phase	16
Domestic Use of National Power	16
Conclusion	18
Bibliography	24
Appendix 1: Timeline	A-1
Appendix 2: Figures 1-15 (Phase Progressions)	B-1
Appendix 3: Disaster Relief Fund, FY 1974-2005	C-1
Appendix 4: Statutory Exceptions to the Posse Comitatus Act	D-1

INTRODUCTION

A gang-related altercation in 1992 and breached levees in 2005 sparked two catastrophes that became “the most deadly [riots] in our history”¹ and “the deadliest [hurricane] in 77 years.”² Even though the specifics of each catastrophe differed significantly, both flowed through six distinctive phases: Buildup, Chaos, Reaction, Federal Planning, National Response, and Recovery. The first three encompass events at the local level and include the trigger event and initial actions by state and local authorities. The last three involve direct federal actions, including military support. Analyzing the Los Angeles Riots of 1992 and Hurricane Katrina in 2005 demonstrate the specific phases of a catastrophe and suggest improvements for future responses.

TERMINOLOGY

For the purpose of this paper, “**federal response**” and “**national response**” are interchangeable and refer to efforts by agencies with chains-of-command tracing back to the executive branch of the U.S. government. This analysis also uses “**catastrophe**” and “**catastrophic event**” as generic terms to describe a tragedy that calls for major and prompt federal assistance. It avoids general use of “**disaster**” and “**emergency**” since the Stafford Act codifies their specific definitions, with associated limitations, as they apply to catastrophic events.³ Another difference of note is between “**activating**” and “**federalizing**” National Guard troops. State governors activate Guardsmen to active duty under the control of the governor. The president federalizes them to active duty to augment military forces, and they are then under the control of the Department of Defense (DoD).⁴

HISTORICAL CONTEXT

Disaster response in America traditionally has been handled by State and local governments, with the Federal government playing a supporting role. Limits on the Federal government's role in disaster response are deeply rooted in American tradition. State and local governments – who know the unique requirements of their citizens and geography and are best positioned to respond to incidents in their own jurisdictions – will always play a larger role in disaster response. The Federal government's supporting role respects these practical points and the sovereignty of the States as well as the power of governors to direct activities and coordinate efforts within their States.

➤ The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina Lessons Learned⁵

Legal and historical precedence originated with the U.S. Constitution and continually evolved (Appendix 1). This included an expanding federal role in disaster response with reliance upon military forces as part of the national effort. Then the terrorist attacks of 9/11 became the impetus to form the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) two years prior to Hurricane Katrina striking the Gulf coast.

During domestic catastrophes, the federal government can utilize its Constitutional mandate to execute federal laws, suppress insurrections, and repel invasions as necessary. It assumes roles that states cannot or should not do on their own, including tasking the nation's military forces and, when warranted, state militias (known today as the National Guard).⁶ The Constitution delineates the responsibilities between federal and state governments, and the Tenth Amendment specifically reserves any power not delegated to or prohibited by the federal government to the states or the people.⁷

Initially, the federal government took a very limited role in responding to domestic catastrophes. When it did, federal actions consisted mostly of military assistance. This was due largely to a national culture that placed liability upon states and localities, with a significant reliance upon churches and charities, for their own response to a catastrophic event. Additionally, citizens realized sole accountability for injury and property damage so they implemented per-

sonal mitigation strategies.⁸ The first use of federal assistance beyond just the military was financial recovery support in 1803 following a fire in Portsmouth, New Hampshire. Over the next 150 years, the federal government helped in just over 100 incidents, but it still did so in a limited, ad hoc manner.⁹

The Posse Comitatus Act became law following the Civil War and constrained the growing use of military forces in domestic applications.¹⁰ However, subsequent statutes clarified the president's ability to employ the military for domestic support in order to suppress insurrection, rebellion, and domestic violence, which are common during catastrophes.¹¹ Although it prevented the direct involvement of the military in law enforcement, including federalized Guardsmen,¹² it did not apply to National Guardsmen activated by the governor.¹³

Two major events forever changed the federal government's limited role: the Great Depression and World War II. President Hoover created the Reconstruction Finance Corporation (RFC) during the Great Depression, which made loans to buy or repair buildings damaged "in earthquakes, fires, tornadoes, or cyclones."¹⁴ President Roosevelt later established the Office for Emergency Management in case the hostilities of World War II resulted in another domestic catastrophe similar to Pearl Harbor. At the end of the war, the federal government incorporated functions from both in the Federal Disaster Relief Act of 1950, "which became the model for later disaster relief legislation."¹⁵ Since then, the federal government took many steps to increase its ability to respond to a major catastrophe. Criticism of federal actions following the accident at the Three Mile Island nuclear power plant in 1979 hurried President Carter's creation of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to "consolidate preparedness for, response to, and mitigation of all types of hazards."¹⁶ In 1988, the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and

Emergency Assistance Act, commonly referred to as the Stafford Act, became the statutory authority regarding national response actions for most federal disasters.¹⁷

The 9/11 terrorist attacks in 2001 shocked the entire response system. Eleven days later, President Bush called for the creation of an Office of Homeland Security to “oversee and coordinate a comprehensive national strategy to safeguard the country against terrorism, and respond to any future attacks.”¹⁸ The Department of Homeland Security formed on 24 January 2003, and most of the major component agencies transferred to it on 1 March 2003.¹⁹ Its mission was to coordinate “federal operations within the United States to prepare for, respond to, and recover from terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies.”²⁰ To integrate all federal responses seamlessly, DHS mandated the use of the National Response Framework.²¹

ANALYZING THE SIX PHASES OF A CATASTROPHE

Although DHS changed the nation’s strategic response to catastrophes, it did not change the catastrophes’ natural progression through the six phases. As evidence, two very different catastrophes bracketing the creation of DHS followed the same pattern. The remaining of this paper addresses their similarities and identifies how the instruments of national power apply to domestic catastrophes.

BUILDUP PHASE

The Buildup Phase encompasses all the contributing factors preceding the chaos associated with a catastrophe (Figure 1). Since this phase exists for years, the critical failures during it only become obvious after a catastrophic event. Many, if not all, of the causative aspects might be apparent individually, but the complexities of society, possibilities of diverse threats,²² severely limited resources, and time constraints make it impossible to appreciate their interconnection beforehand in order to prevent the trigger event from occurring. At times, state and local

governments realize they are on the precipice of a catastrophe and call in additional resources to help. The state's National Guard is critical to provide this surge capacity. A combination of stressors eventually culminates into a trigger event, which becomes the final impetus that moves the situation into the Chaos Phase.

LA RIOTS (Figure 2)

Years of neglect, gang-related incidents, and two judicial rulings provided the catalyst for the Los Angeles Riots of 1992. Since the Watts Riots of 1965, the area experienced increasing poverty, high unemployment, rampant truancy, exploding crime rates, and waning family values that created a sense of desolation within the community.²³ Drive-by shootings killed three babies and increased the tensions in an already volatile area. Local leaders tried to allay the violence, but the latest gang truce existed only so members could focus their aggression on "killing a police officer."²⁴ Adding to these stressors, a legal ruling against a Korean shopkeeper who shot a young African-American was still fresh in the community's mind. A caller into the local radio station illustrated the perceived injustice, "They had evidence that it was murder, but they gave [the Korean] probation, no just sentence. You kill a dog, you go to jail. You kill a Black teenager – nothing."²⁵ Then on 29 April 1992 came the legal acquittal of four police officers, "accused of brutally beating Rodney King" following a high-speed chase.²⁶

Local authorities inaccurately presumed they were ready to handle any subsequent unrest. Rather than increasing law enforcement presence on the streets before the verdict, they did not see a need to change their original plans.²⁷ Since historical evidence indicated that a daytime riot was unlikely, the police departments shifted their assets to report later in the day for use that night.²⁸ Therefore, they were not prepared in the afternoon for the spark (a gang-related altercation at the intersection of Florence and Normandie) that triggered the riots.²⁹

HURRICANE KATRINA (Figure 3)

Geography, a hurricane, and an incomplete evacuation led to a catastrophe in New Orleans during late-August 2005.³⁰ Since much of the city is below sea level, efforts to protect it from flooding began in the early-1700s. As it existed in 2005, the New Orleans Flood and Hurricane Protection System could withstand a Mississippi River flood equivalent to the Flood of 1927 or a very strong Category 2 hurricane.³¹ However, Hurricane Katrina made landfall as a Category 3 hurricane, and its winds produced a storm surge comparable to the surge from Hurricane Camille (a Category 5 hurricane in 1969).³² On 27 August, Louisiana initiated its evacuation plan and requested the president declare a state of emergency, which the president approved the following day.³³ Although the city began evacuations two days prior to and opened several “shelters of last resort” the night before landfall,³⁴ 100,000 people remained in New Orleans.³⁵

Due to the accuracy of its forecasted path, the governors of Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana activated thousands of National Guardsmen ahead of the hurricane’s landfall.³⁶ Guardsmen were instrumental in the evacuation of approximately one million people (90 percent of those in Katrina’s path).³⁷ Prior to landfall, the National Guard also brought 10,000 Meals-Ready-to-Eat and over 13,000 bottles of water to the Superdome. By the morning of 28 August, the National Guard’s Special Reaction Team with 46 members was on scene and conducting security around the stadium. More than 500 Guardsmen joined them throughout the day, including additional medical personnel that increased the total medical compliment to 71.³⁸ The Coast Guard also readied Disaster Assistance Response Teams for deployment to Louisiana and evacuated its personnel from the area.³⁹

Although state and local officials tried to prepare for the approaching storm, they were not prepared for such a large catastrophe. Hurricane Katrina’s storm surge, “overtopped large

sections of the levees east of New Orleans, in Orleans Parish and St. Bernard Parish, and it also pushed water up the Intracoastal Waterway and into the Industrial Canal.”⁴⁰ The compromised levees triggered significant flooding in New Orleans and subsequent devastation attributed to the hurricane.

CHAOS PHASE

When the spark flashes, all the factors that led up to the catastrophe overwhelm the local population and chaos follows (Figure 4). Loss of security and civilian authority typify this phase, and mob rule replaces the rule of law. The Chaos Phase is fast and volatile; it continues until state and local agents make a concerted effort to respond to the unanticipated disorder.

LA RIOTS (Figure 5)

The Los Angeles Police Department responded to the altercation at Florence and Normandie on 29 April 1992 in standard fashion and called in more units as the crowd gathered. About two hours later, the police “left quickly and visibly,”⁴¹ and the area deteriorated with intensifying violence. During this time, Mayor Tom Bradley went on TV to empathize with his constituent’s frustration and said, “We will not tolerate the savage beating of our citizens by a few renegade cops.” Regarding the unrest he added, “We must not endanger the reforms we have achieved by resorting to mindless acts.” However, his words shocked many of the first responders and his plea for restraint failed to calm those already rioting.⁴² By the time the city issued a tactical alert, the rule of law was lost.⁴³ Less than four hours after the verdict was announced, looting began and Reginald Denny was beaten;⁴⁴ anyone entering the area risked assault.⁴⁵ The first fatality of the riots occurred later that evening.⁴⁶

HURRICANE KATRINA (Figure 6)

Soon after Hurricane Katrina's landfall (29 August 2005), three levees failed submerging about 80 percent of New Orleans. The flooding covered some areas in the city with up to 20 feet of water.⁴⁷ In addition, the storm surge created an environmental nightmare. The storm caused the release of more than 7.4 million gallons of oil (about two-thirds that of the *M/V Exxon Valdez* accident in 1989). In all, 466 chemical facilities, hazardous waste sites, and Superfund toxic waste sites yielded a slurry of "standing water, oil pollution, sewage, household and industrial chemicals, and both human and animal remains" that inundated the city.⁴⁸ Katrina's impact also devastated the region's communication infrastructure. The storm cut three million phone lines preventing people from calling for help and crippled 38 Emergency 911 call centers.⁴⁹ Additionally, external communications into New Orleans were severely limited. Approximately 50 percent of radio stations and 44 percent of television stations were off the air.⁵⁰ Within 12 hours after the hurricane's landfall, escalating looting and violence raged throughout the city.⁵¹

REACTION PHASE

The Reaction Phase encompasses the state and local responses to a trigger event and its subsequent chaos (Figure 7). Although state and local actions continue well beyond the completion of the National Response Phase, the Reaction Phase encompasses early response efforts by state and local entities. During this phase, the governor will utilize the state's National Guard and local officials will employ neighboring assets if available. The preparations during the Build-up Phase along with the initial measures and availability of the right capabilities determine if an event is controlled and remains a localized tragedy or devolves into a catastrophe that initiates a federal response. This phase ends with the official request for federal assistance.

LA RIOTS (Figure 8)

Responding personnel remembered the Watts Riots of 1965 when military and law enforcement members had little restriction on their use of force and killed several innocent civilians. Senior law enforcement officers did not want a similar result and restrained the rules of engagement during the Los Angeles Riots of 1992.⁵² Additionally, the dangers firefighters faced when responding to calls forced Sheriff's deputies to change their priorities to provide security to them instead of suppressing the riots.⁵³ A Sheriff's operations log described the situation:

Our entire field force is committed. Looters have overwhelmed our resources. Belligerent crowds are forming and defying uniform deputies. What we need is 250 personnel that can secure locations once cleared by uniform personnel. (National Guard, Custody Personnel, Recruits, Reserves.) Present number of personnel will be insufficient for night shift.⁵⁴

Approximately five hours after the looting commenced on 29 April, the mayor activated 2,000 California National Guardsmen. They were available before the next morning, but remained on stand-by because inaccurate intelligence indicated the unrest was more akin to a "Mardi Gras atmosphere" than the ominous situation it was.⁵⁵ By noon on 30 April, the Sheriff's Department was pleading for some soldiers to help; however, General Delk, the field commander, did not want to send his Guardsmen in:

We hadn't had enough time to do all the things we needed to do. Nobody should ever commit to providing soldiers on the street in less than 24 hours if there's going to be shooting. You have to have rules of engagement and arming orders; you have to coordinate unit orders and understand where you go to get your support. All are very important things that keep your soldiers from being killed and are essential to keep from killing innocent people.⁵⁶

While they lacked clear rules of engagement and suffered from dysfunctional command and control, National Guardsmen started arriving less than 24 hours after looting began due in part to the favorable relationship between General Delk and Undersheriff Bob Edmonds.⁵⁷

When the Guardsmen tried to integrate into the response, it increased friction between them and

local law enforcement, as well as within the National Guard units, as they adjusted their mindset to local constraints.⁵⁸ On the other hand, most of the Guardsmen were police officers in their civilian profession so they eased integration into the law enforcement systems.⁵⁹ As the civilian and military leadership met to determine the proper command and control, the personalities of the individuals involved determined the outcome of discussions given the lack of previously agreed upon procedures. Preexisting conflicts induced unnecessary friction during the discussions—the mayor had not spoken with his police chief for thirteen months, and the Sheriff’s Department competed against the Police Department for funding.⁶⁰

Since local law enforcement diverted assets to protect the Fire Department during the early stages of the riots, National Guardsmen assumed that role once they were on scene. The simple presence of rifles was enough to stop the sniping that previously harassed the Fire Department.⁶¹ Augmenting the response with National Guard forces also helped stop the increase in fires and crimes in the area.⁶² Just before midnight on 30 April, the Los Angeles mayor asked “the U.S. military to be placed ‘on alert,’”⁶³ and the governor submitted the formal request for federal troops to President Bush about an hour later.⁶⁴

HURRICANE KATRINA (Figure 9)

The loss of communications shattered the local response by incapacitating the first responders who also served a secondary role as the eyes and ears for the emergency response system. As a result, they could not meet the residents’ needs and it took hours for officials in the state’s capital to learn that the levees in New Orleans failed.⁶⁵ The few services in the area able to take action were blind without their communications, and any emergency responders outside the devastated area could not get in due to downed trees, broken power lines, and flooded roads.⁶⁶ In addition, most of the state and federal officials spent much of 29 August planning for

search-and-rescue missions, unaware that hundreds faced a rapidly deteriorating situation. It was not until the next day that the destruction was obvious and responders chose to focus on saving lives over evacuating those who had basic necessities.⁶⁷ Due to the lack of public information, residents gathered at places they assumed were safe such as the Ernest N. Morial Convention Center. However, this compounded problems for the response system because these places were not designated evacuation points and provided little to no shelter.⁶⁸ Similarly, rescue aircraft did not have specific direction so they lifted victims as they could and brought them to the Superdome or other impromptu locations such as an elevated section of Interstate 10 called the “cloverleaf.”⁶⁹ This exasperated local responders in New Orleans who were already overwhelmed immediately following the hurricane’s passing as recognized by Mayor Nagin:

Thousands of people were stranded on their rooftops, or in attics, needing to be rescued...Our first responders were jumping into the water to rescue people as 911 operators were consumed with traumatic calls for rescue. They received thousands upon thousands of frantic and desperate calls.⁷⁰

On 29 August, water inundated the National Guard’s Joint Operations Center (JOC) forward deployed at Jackson Barracks in New Orleans. Once it started to flood, the water level rose rapidly – from one to ten feet within 30 minutes. This trapped several Guardsmen in another building who needed immediate rescue. Those not engaged with responding to their own flooding situation used pre-staged flat-bottom boats and several “liberated” Wildlife and Fisheries boats to rescue people from rooftops or free them from attics.⁷¹ However, the JOC abandoned Jackson Barracks the following morning and relocated to the Superdome.⁷² Meanwhile, both Coast Guard and National Guard airborne assets conducted search-and-rescue operations,⁷³ and the Louisiana governor utilized the Emergency Management Assistance Compact to obtain additional National Guard assets from other governors to assist with its response.⁷⁴ On 30 August, state and local officials called upon the federal government for help.⁷⁵

FEDERAL PLANNING PHASE

The Federal Planning Phase begins when the national response system assigns an entity to start planning for a catastrophe (Figure 10). Although this phase starts after the Executive Branch pledges federal assets to assist state and local governments, some planning can begin earlier if federal agencies anticipate a possible catastrophe. Due to the general surprise of a catastrophe, the Federal Planning Phase is quick and does not allow the development of unique, comprehensive plans or operational orders before federal resources are needed on scene. Due to the expedited timeframe, the near-term planning focuses on augmenting the state and local response efforts and ends once military units deploy on their first sortie. This phase does not include long-term planning, which concentrates on recovery efforts and is part of the Recovery Phase.

LA RIOTS (Figure 11)

Early on 1 May 1992, the Army and Marine Corps received tasking to respond to the riots, and the first federal troops departed for Los Angeles that afternoon (about 48 hours after looting began).⁷⁶ That evening, President Bush announced that he deployed federal troops to Los Angeles.⁷⁷ Approximately an hour after the broadcast, the governor demanded to know why federal troops were not on the streets, even though they had not arrived yet.⁷⁸ Although over 2,000 soldiers from U.S. Army's 7th Infantry Division and 1,500 marines from 1st Marine Expeditionary Force assembled at the staging area later that night, the Joint Task Force Commander refused to deploy them until the next day so they could train, familiarize themselves with the situation, and finish planning for the next day's operations. At 2200, he met with the Police Chief and Sheriff to discuss how to coordinate federal troops with their efforts. Although allowed by the presidential declaration, he stunned local law enforcement when he decided that

federalized troops, now including the Guardsmen originally activated by the governor, would no longer perform routine law enforcement duties. The Task Force Commander restricted their use to stability operations through force presence.⁷⁹

HURRICANE KATRINA (Figure 12)

Department of Homeland Security's lead agency for any post-hurricane federal assistance was the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), and the U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) performed this role for DoD. However, FEMA was never intended to be a first responder. Therefore, FEMA operated on the periphery as the hurricane approached.⁸⁰ FEMA pre-positioned many assets and supplies in order to respond immediately following the hurricane's passing.⁸¹ Similarly, the military commenced preparations as the hurricane approached. NORTHCOM began monitoring Katrina on 23 August,⁸² and issued a Warning Order to its supporting commands the following day.⁸³ It was not until 30 August that NORTHCOM and the Joint Chiefs of Staff received authorization to plan and conduct disaster relief operations.⁸⁴ Subsequently, it activated Joint Task Force-Katrina on 31 August to integrate the military's actions into the federal response.⁸⁵

NATIONAL RESPONSE PHASE

The National Response Phase covers the federal response during the near-term to augment state and local response efforts in order to stabilize the situation and reestablish the Rule of Law (Figure 13). Due to its capabilities and flexibility, the federal government relies upon the military to assume a significant role in the national response. This phase begins once federal assets, whether civilian or military, initially deploy into the affected area and ends once national response units demobilize.

LA RIOTS (Figure 14)

Although the Los Angeles Riots initiated a federal response, federal assets did not arrive on scene until after the rule of law returned to the area.⁸⁶ During the afternoon of 2 May, the Marine battalion departed on its first deployment followed soon afterwards by the Army troops.⁸⁷ Some of the delay resulted from a lack of sufficient missions for the extra forces.⁸⁸ The tasking process slowed even more once the Attorney General's office needed to approve all mission requests, which took over eight hours to complete and decreased the approval rate to 10 percent, down from 100 percent before federalization.⁸⁹ Another change that frustrated many Guardsmen, troops, and law enforcement officers was a "new arming order prohibiting troops from having ammunition in their weapons without special approval from headquarters. As a result, some units felt compelled to follow the order, other units ignored it, and others began sending out only those soldiers who volunteered for duty."⁹⁰ In addition, the new restraints upon the National Guard's utility induced friction and hindered progress. As Sid Heal pointed out, "Just when we were getting to where we thought the Guard was really being effective, they federalized them."⁹¹

Early on 3 May, the Joint Task Force Commander released the neighboring law enforcement officers and firefighters who joined the local response as part of California's mutual aid system.⁹² By then there were 10,500 federal troops in the Los Angeles area. Later that night firefighters finally extinguished most of the fires.⁹³ Although the situation stabilized to pre-trigger event levels, the federal troops remained on patrol for another three weeks before finally demobilizing.⁹⁴

HURRICANE KATRINA (Figure 15)

FEMA struggled in managing the massive national response. In his statement before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security, Secretary Michael Chertoff said:

One of the biggest barriers to the response to Katrina was not being able to get supplies quickly into the areas that needed them the most. Of course, during Katrina, the flooded streets and extensive damage to critical infrastructure prevented many supplies from reaching the most heavily damaged areas in a timely fashion. FEMA employees did the best they could under these conditions with the resources they had. Despite [their] remarkable effort, FEMA's logistics systems simply were not up to the task of handling a truly catastrophic event. FEMA lacks the technology and information management systems to effectively track shipments and manage inventories.⁹⁵

On 3 September, FEMA turned to the DoD to provide transportation and distribution of necessities and medical supplies.⁹⁶ Two days later, Secretary Chertoff appointed Vice Admiral Thad Allen from the Coast Guard to replace FEMA's Director as the Principle Federal Official.⁹⁷ During the catastrophe, the DoD oversaw: 14,000 active duty personnel,⁹⁸ 963 sorties by military helicopters,⁹⁹ mosquito abatement missions by military aircraft to help prevent the spread of diseases,¹⁰⁰ the largest domestic airlift of 24,000 evacuees, and a major medical airlift.¹⁰¹ Military personnel performed other missions including search and rescue, security, evacuations, food and water distribution, salvage, sewage restoration, relief worker billeting, air traffic control, and fuel distribution. Within a week after landfall, the National Guard contingent grew to 65 helicopters and 50,000 Guardsmen in the region.¹⁰² In addition, the Coast Guard rescued 33,000 people, which is six times the number it rescued in all of 2004, and FEMA deployed all 28 of its Urban Search and Rescue units saving more than 6,500 people.¹⁰³

Law enforcement and military personnel finally reestablished security on 13 September.¹⁰⁴ By 15 September, the situation improved greatly, and Mayor Nagin "announced that businesses and residents will be allowed to return to the city beginning Monday, 19 Septem-

ber.”¹⁰⁵ However, Hurricane Rita threatened the region so the mayor closed the city again on 20 September and asked those who returned to evacuate.¹⁰⁶ By 11 October, no more floodwater remained in New Orleans and the response effort transitioned into the Recovery Phase.¹⁰⁷

RECOVERY PHASE

The Recovery Phase can last decades depending on the extent of the damage, availability of resources, and ease of reconstruction. It addresses the aftermath of a catastrophe and involves non-military elements of federal, state, and local levels. This phase extends years and the complexities of it are beyond the scope of this paper.

DOMESTIC USE OF NATIONAL POWER

Reducing the potency of contributing factors during the Buildup Phase is the first opportunity to prevent a catastrophe. This requires a concerted political effort by local, state, and federal officials to identify and address causative aspects before a trigger event occurs. To mitigate additional friction from politics and personality conflicts during the catastrophe, contingency plans must be ready to implement and practiced regularly. Incorporating senior officials during exercises helps prepare them for difficult decisions and prevents them from developing unrealistic expectations. It also helps build those interpersonal relationships necessary to resolve unusual circumstances not covered by the plan or established procedures. The plans must include how and when the governor will activate the state’s National Guard, along with when to initiate federal assistance. They should also easily integrate with DHS’s National Response Framework and Incident Command Structure. Unfortunately, Hurricane Katrina exposed significant flaws in the nation’s preparedness for a catastrophe because the federal response was not a “seamless, coordinated effort that had been envisioned by President Bush when he ordered the creation of a National Response Plan in February 2003.”¹⁰⁸

Although it is important prior to a catastrophe to manage expectations of government officials and residents, the informational instrument is crucial following the trigger event. Seeing law enforcement or first responders performing their duties helps convince residents that local civil order remains intact. Emergency communications are also necessary to direct the civil servants in the devastated area and get vital information back to responsible leadership. Announcements into the area are just as vital because it informs the population about local efforts and actions they can take to help themselves. It can reinforce the image that state and local authorities are in charge and dealing with the situation, but poor messages will escalate the chaos rather than calm it. In Los Angeles, the mayor's comments only reinforced the community's anger and disheartened his first responders. Likewise, state and local officials portraying area residents as victims of an egregious wrong is counterproductive such as the mayor of New Orleans publicly venting his anger over his perceived lack of a federal response rather than reassuring his citizens.¹⁰⁹

Fortunately, the nation has a robust military to fill gaps at the federal, state, and local levels. The National Guard is the best agency for state and local governments to rely upon as a reaction force during the first three phases due to its ability to bring critical capabilities including an "expertise in communications, logistics, search and rescue, and decontamination" into a devastated area quickly.¹¹⁰ In Los Angeles, Guardsmen arrived within hours due to their organic air assets.¹¹¹ For Hurricane Katrina, area governors activated and prepositioned them in advance of the storm.¹¹² For catastrophes, the DoD can bring well-trained and large numbers of personnel, logistic capabilities, planning expertise, and robust communications infrastructure during the National Response Phase. As an authority in health emergencies and disaster response, Rear Admiral W. Craig Vanderwagen advocates for the military's role in future catastrophes. He pro-

claims its logistical capabilities greatly surpass civilian abilities and the military can surge to fill voids to meet extensive and time-critical requirements. He also points out that the U.S. Northern Command is “extraordinarily important in filling gaps that the civilian population just can’t deal with in a timely manner.”¹¹³ However, there is still a lack of pre-established parameters, training, and standard equipment. One significant handicap to federal troops was a lack of Rules of Engagement comparable to the law enforcement community’s Use of Force policy.

Internal application of the economic instrument of national power directly attributable to preventing, responding to, and recovering from catastrophes is immeasurable and ongoing. One apparent trend is expenditures continue to increase as the federal government assumes more of a role in responding to catastrophes. For example, monies for disaster relief grew dramatically from 1.7 billion in 1990 to 10.5 billion dollars in 2005 (Appendix 3).¹¹⁴

CONCLUSION

This analysis started with two personal suppositions: 1) there is an overreliance upon the federal government to respond to catastrophes, and 2) the military is not the correct entity to augment national response efforts. However, the federal government is indeed the right entity to respond to a catastrophe and the military is a critical part of its national response. Previous trends also indicate that state and local governments will take fewer mitigation strategies; thereby, further increasing their dependence upon the federal government to survive and recover from catastrophes.¹¹⁵ More importantly, past cases reveal that dissimilar catastrophes follow a similar pattern.

In addition to valuable lessons from each phase, two stark warnings become apparent. First, state and local leaders must ensure their reliance upon the federal government does not make their reaction contingent upon it since a national response lags behind a trigger event.

Compromising their initial response capabilities and efficiency will increase the risk that a future tragedy worsens into a catastrophe. Second, the national response relies significantly upon military support. Due to its primary mission, though, the U.S. cannot rely exclusively upon the military to provide these functions in the future.¹¹⁶

The last two decades experienced numerous domestic disasters or emergencies; however, several tragic events never escalated into catastrophic ones. What happened at the state and local levels that prevented these trigger events from escalating into a catastrophe? Perhaps a better analysis would focus on lessons learned from these crises so state and local leaders can apply them in future situations.

¹ James D. Delk, *Soldiers in Cities: Military Operations on Urban Terrain*, (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2001), 95, <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?PubID=294> (accessed October 25, 2009). Cited hereafter as Delk, *Soldiers in Cities*.

² Richard D. Knabb, Jamie R. Rhome, and Daniel P. Brown, *Tropical Cyclone Report, Hurricane Katrina, 23-30 August 2005*, (Miami, FL: National Hurricane Center, 2005), 11.

³ Federal Emergency Management Agency, *Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, As Amended, and Related Authorities*, (Washington, DC: Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2007), 2. Cited hereafter as FEMA, *Stafford Act*.

⁴ U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, *Hurricane Katrina: DOD Disaster Response*, by Steve Bowman, Lawrence Kapp, and Amy Belasco, Washington, DC, 2005, (RL33095), 7-9.

⁵ Frances Fragos Townsend, *The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned*, (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2006), 11.

⁶ National Archives [Database Online], "Transcript of the Constitution of the United States – Official," (Washington, DC), U.S. Constitution, art. 1, sec. 8, http://www.archives.gov/exhibits/charters/constitution_transcript.html (accessed February 4, 2010).

⁷ National Archives [Database Online], "Bill of Rights Transcript," (Washington, DC), U.S. Constitution, amend. 10, http://www.archives.gov/exhibits/charters/bill_of_rights_transcript.html (accessed February 4, 2010).

⁸ Elizabeth Witham and others, *Financing Recovery from Catastrophic Events*, Task 06-42, (Arlington, VA: Homeland Security Institute, 2007), 6.

⁹ Townsend, 11.

¹⁰ Matt Matthews, *The Posse Comitatus Act and the United States Army: A Historical Perspective*, Global War on Terrorism Occasional Paper 14 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2006), 33

¹¹ Matthews, 40.

¹² FEMA, NRF, 9.

¹³ National Response Framework, 39.

¹⁴ Witham and others, 7-8.

¹⁵ Witham and other, 7-9.

¹⁶ Reorganization Plan #3 of 1978 (43 FR 41943), enacted by Executive Order 12127 in 1979, as cited in Witham and others, 12.

¹⁷ Federal Emergency Management Agency [Database Online], "Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (Public Law 93-288) As Amended," (Washington, DC, 2009), <http://www.fema.gov/about/stafact.shtm> (accessed December 29, 2009).

¹⁸ Department of Homeland Security, *Brief Documentary History of the Department of Homeland Security, 2001-2008*, (Washington, DC: DHS History Office, 2008), 4.

¹⁹ DHS, 10.

²⁰ Chertoff, 4.

²¹ Federal Emergency Management Agency, "National Response Framework, Resource Center," <http://www.fema.gov/emergency/nrf/incidentannexes.htm> (accessed February 20/2010).

²² Andy Hall proclaims the 21st century will face complex and emerging threats from, "a wide spectrum of manmade and natural hazards. Those manmade threats may be accidental, including oil spills, land and urban fires, hazardous material releases, transportation accidents, disruption to the Nation's energy and information technology infrastructure; or deliberate terrorists attack. Natural hazards include hurricanes, tornadoes, floods, earthquakes, pandemics, etc." Andy Hall, "Improving Military Response to Catastrophic Events within the United States," (Master of Strategic Studies, U.S. Army War College, 2009), 1.

²³ Delk, *Soldiers in Cities*, 89-90.

²⁴ Delk, *Soldiers in Cities*, 90.

²⁵ Phylis Johnson, *KJLH-FM and the Los Angeles Riots Of 1992: Compton's Neighborhood Station in the Aftermath of the Rodney King Verdict*, (Jefferson, NC: Mcfarland & Company, Inc, 2009), 6.

²⁶ Delk, *Soldiers in Cities*, 90.

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- ²⁷ James Delk, *The City's Many Faces: Proceedings of the RAND Arroyo-MCWL-J8 UWG Urban Operations Conference, April 13-14, 1999*, Ed. Russell W. Glenn, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2000), 90-91. Cited hereafter as Delk, *The City's Many Faces*.
- ²⁸ Delk, *The City's Many Faces*, Pg 83.
- ²⁹ Delk, *The City's Many Faces*, 91.
- ³⁰ James Wombwell, *Army Support During the Hurricane Katrina Disaster (Long War Series Occasional Paper 29)*, (Combat Studies Institute, Department of the Army, 2009), 48.
- ³¹ Townsend, 35.
- ³² Townsend, 1.
- ³³ Wombwell, 1.
- ³⁴ DeLozier.
- ³⁵ James Wombwell, *Army Support During the Hurricane Katrina Disaster (Long War Series Occasional Paper 29)*, (Combat Studies Institute, Department of the Army, 2009), 48.
- ³⁶ Wombwell, 18.
- ³⁷ Wombwell, 48.
- ³⁸ Townsend, 30.
- ³⁹ U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Coast Guard, *Hurricane Katrina: The U.S. Coast Guard at its Best*, (Washington, DC, 2005), 15, as cited in Townsend, 28.
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- ⁴¹ Delk, *Soldiers in Cities*, 91.
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- ⁴³ Delk, *The City's Many Faces*, 89.
- ⁴⁴ Delk, *The City's Many Faces*, 88-89.
- ⁴⁵ Delk, *The City's Many Faces*, 91.
- ⁴⁶ Delk, *The City's Many Faces*, 89.
- ⁴⁷ Richard D. Knabb, Jamie R. Rhome, and Daniel P. Brown, 9.
- ⁴⁸ Townsend, 8.
- ⁴⁹ Townsend, 8.
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- ⁵¹ DeLozier.
- ⁵² Delk, *The City's Many Faces*, 84.
- ⁵³ Charles "Sid" Heal, "A Dozen Lessons," *The Tactical Edge*, Fall 1992, 11.
- ⁵⁴ Charles "Sid" Heal, "A Dozen Lessons," *The Tactical Edge*, Fall 1992, 11.
- ⁵⁵ Delk, *The City's Many Faces*, 90.
- ⁵⁶ Delk, *The City's Many Faces*, 91.
- ⁵⁷ Delk, *The City's Many Faces*, 91.
- ⁵⁸ Delk, *The City's Many Faces*, 85.
- ⁵⁹ Delk, *The City's Many Faces*, 91.
- ⁶⁰ Delk, *The City's Many Faces*, 92-93.
- ⁶¹ Delk, *The City's Many Faces*, 102.
- ⁶² Delk, *The City's Many Faces*, 104.
- ⁶³ LA Times.
- ⁶⁴ Rosegrants, 25.
- ⁶⁵ Wombwell, 39-40.
- ⁶⁶ Wombwell, 40.
- ⁶⁷ Wombwell, 50-52.
- ⁶⁸ Townsend, 39.

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- ⁷⁰ Chris Buell, *New Orleans mayor declares "martial law," pulls police from rescues to halt looting*. Jurist Legal News & Research, <http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/paperchase/2005/08/update-new-orleans-mayor-declares.php> (accessed April 1, 2010).
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- ⁷³ Townsend, 38.
- ⁷⁴ Townsend, 37.
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- ⁷⁷ Rosegrant (C), 16.
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- ⁷⁹ Rosegrant (C), 17.
- ⁸⁰ Michael Chertoff, *Statement for Secretary Michael Chertoff, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs*, (Washington, DC), 3.
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- ⁸² Admiral Timothy J. Keating, Commander North American Aerospace Defense Command and U.S. Northern Command, written statement for a hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Preparedness and Response by the Department of Defense, the Coast Guard, and the National Guard of Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama, on October 27, 2005, submitted to the House Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, 109th Congress, 1st session, as cited in Townsend, 22.
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- ⁸⁴ Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Execution Order, August 30, 2005, as cited in Townsend, 42.
- ⁸⁵ Townsend, 190.
- ⁸⁶ Rosegrant (C), 18.
- ⁸⁷ Rosegrant (C), 18.
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- ⁸⁹ Delk, *The City's Many Faces*, 110-113.
- ⁹⁰ Rosegrant (C), 19-20.
- ⁹¹ Rosegrant (C), 18.
- ⁹² Delk, *The City's Many Faces*, 107.
- ⁹³ Rosegrant (C), 20.
- ⁹⁴ Delk, *The City's Many Faces*, 107.
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- ⁹⁶ Townsend, 45.
- ⁹⁷ Townsend, 47.
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- ¹⁰⁰ "DOD aircraft have flown mosquito abatement aerial spraying missions covering more than two million acres." Paul McHale, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, written statement for a hearing on Responding to Catastrophic Events: The Role of the Military and National Guard in Disaster Response, on November 9, 2005, submitted to the House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional Threats, and Capabilities jointly with the House Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, Science, and Technology, 109th Congress, 1st session, as cited in Townsend, 43.
- ¹⁰¹ Townsend, 40.
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- ¹⁰⁵ Wombwell, 250.

¹⁰⁶ TPM.

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¹⁰⁹ Nagin, Ray, "Mayor to Feds: 'Get off Your Assess,' Transcript of Radio Interview with New Orleans' Nagin," <http://www.cnn.com/2005/US/09/02/nagin.transcript/> (accessed March 7, 2010).

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¹¹¹ Delk, *The City's Many Faces*, 109.

¹¹² Townsend, 26.

¹¹³ Kruzel.

¹¹⁴ Bea, 5-7.

¹¹⁵ Witham and others, 5-6.

¹¹⁶ Townsend, 54.

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Appendix 1: Timeline

The United States Constitution: “The Founders created a constitutional framework in which each State, upon ratification of the Constitution, ceded some of its powers to the Federal government to create one united yet limited central government. The Constitution sets forth the specific and delegated powers that delineate Federal and State roles. It tells us which branches and offices will be part of the Federal government, what powers they may exercise, and what limitations constrain them. The Constitution also respects State powers by reserving those powers not given to the Federal government to the States or to the people. Our Federal system provides a structure to enable coordination between the United States government and State governments to create a balance that respects the sovereignty of both entities.”¹

Federalist Papers: Federalist No. 8 advocated the benefits of the army to suppress an occasional mob or insurrection. In addition, Federalist No. 28 justified the use of force to quell seditions and insurrections. While Federalist No. 29 recommended forming a highly trained militia to apply necessary force correctly.²

The Calling Forth Act (May 2, 1792): “The Second Congress of the United States endorsed the Calling Forth Act. This law implied that a federal marshal could use the militia as part of a posse Comitatus. The bill also authorized the president to call on the states’ militia forces (when Congress was out of session) to repel invasions from both foreign and domestic enemies, and to quell insurrections within the United States.”³

The Whiskey Rebellion of 1794: “In July 1794, after rebels burned the home of a federal tax collector, and several thousand insurrectionists gathered to challenge openly the authority of the federal government, it appeared that the Pennsylvania state authorities were unwilling or unable to restore order. In response, President Washington requested an opinion from Associate Supreme Court Justice James Wilson to determine whether the revolt was a ‘combination too powerful to be suppressed by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings’ as the Calling Forth Act required. Within two days the judge responded, declaring ‘the laws of the United States are opposed, and the execution thereof obstructed by combinations too powerful to be suppressed by the ordinary course of Judicial proceedings or by the powers vested in the Marshal of the district.’”⁴ “On 24 September, the peace commissioners reported that although they had made some progress, they felt they could not collect the excise tax in certain counties, and that they needed a more powerful force. By October, Washington had federalized and assembled over 10,000 militiamen to put down the rebellion. Nevertheless, his greatest concern was that the newly assembled army would circumvent civilian authority, and he worked diligently to prevent such an occurrence.”⁵

February 28, 1795: “Congress revamped the Calling Forth Act of 1792. Delighted by Washington’s performance during the Whiskey Rebellion, Congress increased the president’s power. The president no longer had to rely on a judge before calling out the militia. More importantly, he could call forth citizen soldiers to put down insurrections and uphold the laws even when Congress was in session.”⁶

1799: “A minor tax rebellion in eastern Pennsylvania, eerily similar in some ways to the excise revolt faced by Washington in 1794, confronted President John Adams. Adams responded, to a great extent, in the same manner as Washington, albeit with one notable exception. Apparently

Appendix 1: Timeline

unconcerned with any provisions in the Act of 1795, Secretary of War James McHenry called on both Regular Army units and militia forces to quell the insurrection.”⁷

Portsmouth, NH, Fires (1802 & 1806): “The earliest case of congressionally-approved domestic disaster assistance to domestic disaster sufferers followed massive fires in the thriving maritime port city of Portsmouth, Rockingham County, New Hampshire on December 26, 1802 at 4 a.m. and December 24, 1806. On January 14, 1803, just 19 days after the fire, Congress authorized ‘the Secretary of the Treasury to suspend, for a limited time, the collection of bonds due to the United States by merchants of Portsmouth, New Hampshire, who...suffered by the...conflagration of that town.’ On January 22, 1807, just 21 days after the 1806 conflagration, Congress authorized ‘all persons who, being indebted to the United States for duties on merchandise, have given bond therefore, with one, or more sureties, payable to the collector for the district of Portsmouth, in the state of New Hampshire, and who have suffered a loss of property by the late conflagration at that place, shall be and hereby are allowed to take up, or have cancelled, all bonds heretofore given for duties as aforesaid, upon giving to the said collector new bonds, with one or more sureties, to the satisfaction of the said collector, for the sums of their former bonds respectively, payable in twelve months.’ The rationale behind providing federal support to the town of Portsmouth was its huge contribution to US commerce, whose tariffs fed the thin federal coffers. Portsmouth needed to rebuild as soon as possible so that these revenues could continue to flow to the Treasury.”⁸

President Jefferson’s Domestic Rebellion (1806): “In 1806 when Aaron Burr threatened to launch a filibuster against Spanish-held territories in Florida and Mexico, President Thomas Jefferson issued an edict demanding that ‘all officers civil and military,’ along with ‘judges, justices, and other officers of the peace,’ help crush what he considered a domestic rebellion. Concerned about the legalities of using the Regular Army, Jefferson consulted James Madison for a legal opinion. Madison responded by informing the president, ‘it does not appear that regular troops can be employed under any legal provision against insurrections—but only against expeditions having foreign countries as the object.’ Exasperated by this perceived limitation on the executive branch, Jefferson requested that Congress grant him the power to use the Regular Army in cases of insurrections. On 3 March 1807, Congress passed a new act allowing the president to call on all land and naval forces to uphold the nation’s laws. Jefferson signed the bill into law five days later, significantly strengthening the president’s authority in cases of civil unrest.”⁹

New Madrid Earthquakes (1811-1812): “Between December 16, 1811 and February 7, 1812, as described elsewhere, a series of strong earthquakes struck what was then the Missouri Territory destroying Catherville and severely damaging New Madrid, the second largest town in the territory. In January 1814, the territorial assembly from Missouri Territory petitioned Congress for aid and cited congressional aid to victims of the Venezuelan earthquake as precedent for their request...A year after the petition by the Missouri Territory assembly, ‘Congress passed a law granting landholders with property damaged by the quake the right to relocate on other public lands in the territory,’ according to Foster. ‘The act allowed residents to claim 160 acres if they held present claims smaller than that or a plot equivalent to their present claims if they held more than 640 acres. Once they had secured new claims, their land in New Madrid reverted to the government.”¹⁰

Appendix 1: Timeline

Great New York Fire of 1835: “The Great New York Fire of 1835 on Wednesday night, December 16, 1835, was exceptional for many reasons. The weather was unspeakable—the temperature was below zero and deep snow was everywhere. Two heavy fires had occurred two nights earlier—one on Christie and Delancey Streets that destroyed some six buildings, and another on Water Street that destroyed seven more buildings. Fighting these two fires required the skill of the entire NY Fire Department, some 1,500 strong. Already spent, these firefighters then were called to work the fire on December 16, which raged from 16-24 hours and burned down 674 buildings covering 17 blocks and 50 acres of ground in the heart of the city. The section of the city that was destroyed contained the banks, the Stock Exchange, the Post Office, two churches, the dry goods warehouses, and some of the finest buildings of the city, according to one report. The great fire of 1835 in New York was the worst in any English-speaking country since the fire of London in 1666...What followed the conflagration was as devastating as the conflagration itself. Merchants who had purchased fire insurance before the fire learned that the fire insurance firms had themselves been wiped out in the fire leading to THEIR bankruptcies. Thus, insurance to make good the losses of the merchants was not forthcoming... The 24th Congress responded to New York on January 11, 1836 with a bill very similar to the one passed for Portsmouth, NH, fire some 34 years earlier.”¹¹

Dorr Rebellion in 1842: “In 1849, the United States Supreme Court provided additional backing to the executive branch when it ruled in favor of President John Tyler, who had threatened to use military force against an armed uprising in Rhode Island during the Dorr Rebellion in 1842. In the case of *Luther v. Borden*, Chief Justice Roger B. Taney fully upheld the president’s prerogative.”¹²

The Army and the Fugitive Slave Act in 1850: “With the passage of the Fugitive Slave Act in 1850, the Army was plunged into a boiling political caldron kindled by pro-slavery and free-state zealots. The new law bolstered both the Constitution and the 1793 Fugitive Slave Law by making it the duty of US marshals and their deputies to apprehend escaped slaves anywhere in the United States or its territories when issued the proper documentation from federal authorities.”¹³ “In reviewing the matter, the Senate Judiciary Committee stood firmly with [President] Fillmore, finding that a marshal could call on both the militia and the Regular Army as a posse comitatus.”¹⁴

Slave Revolt in 1859: “Attempting to ferment a slave revolt, John Brown and 18 abolitionists seized government buildings and hostages in what could be termed America’s first terrorist attack. The Secretary of War and President Buchanan acted swiftly to procure federal troops under the command of Colonel Robert E. Lee to crush the insurrection. The response of the US government to Brown’s raid may serve as a precursor for future military operations on American soil when terrorist attacks threaten to overwhelm local law enforcement.”¹⁵

Creation of Posse Comitatus (1865-1878):

End of 1865: “By the close of 1865, Johnson had appointed scores of pardoned ex-Confederates to preside over Southern state governments. Taking full advantage of Johnson’s altruistic agenda, newly formed pro-Confederate state administrations sprang up throughout the South. These traditionalist governments acted quickly to pass new laws, known as “Black Codes,” severely limiting the rights of blacks...Johnson’s liberal approach to Reconstruction produced a

Appendix 1: Timeline

resurgence of conservative state governments across the South that encouraged unimpeded racism and terror campaigns against the black population. While the Army tried to maintain some semblance of order and justice using military commissions, provost courts, and courts established by the Freedman's Bureau, President Johnson continually hampered their efforts.¹⁶

April 1866: "Outraged by the atrocities occurring throughout the South, an invigorated and radicalized Congress struck back. In April 1866, after overriding President Johnson's veto, Congress passed the Civil Rights Act, a direct assault on the Southern "Black Codes." The new law made anyone born in the United States a citizen (with the exception of Native Americans) and greatly expanded the rights of blacks. Interestingly, the Civil Rights Act contained a posse comitatus clause almost identical to the one used in the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850."¹⁷

June 1866: "Congress fired a second volley into President Johnson's policies on 13 June 1866 when it proposed the 14th Amendment to the US Constitution. Section 1 of this amendment proclaimed, in part, that no state can 'deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.' In July 1866, in support of Congress' efforts to protect black Southern citizens, General in Chief Ulysses S. Grant issued General Order No. 44 empowering US Army forces in the South to arrest anyone involved in crimes aimed at 'citizens and inhabitants of the United States' when local law enforcement failed to do so."¹⁸

March 1867: "After making significant gains in the elections of 1866, radical Republicans in the 39th Congress passed the First Reconstruction Act on 2 March 1867, setting in motion a series of events that would result in US Army control of governments across the South. Claiming that 'no legal State governments or adequate protection for life or property now exist in the rebel States,' Congress declared the existing Southern governments merely provisional. A military commander who was empowered under ensuing acts to remove any official from office would now control the Southern states (except Tennessee, which had already rejoined the Union). The Army would enforce the rules, guaranteeing the protection of 'all persons in their rights of person and property,' and 'to suppress insurrections, disorders, and violence, and to punish, or cause to be punished, all disturbers of the public peace and criminals.' More importantly, the Army would ensure black males were allowed to vote and that former Confederates were not."¹⁹

April 1871: "After dismantling Georgia's state government for the second time, and passing two enforcement acts to deal with the Klan, Congress passed a third and more draconian measure known as the Ku Klux Klan Act on 20 April 1871."²⁰

October 1871: "[President] Grant, after issuing two proclamations for the Klan to cease and desist, suspended the writ of habeas corpus in several northern counties of South Carolina. Under the control of a federal marshal, the Army conducted a coordinated sweep of the countryside, rounding up 600 men with ties to the Klan...By the fall of 1871, the Army had provided support for 200 posses in South Carolina alone."²¹

1874: "The Democratic Party had regained control of the House of Representatives, and by 1876, only Louisiana, Florida, and South Carolina remained under radical Republican control.

Appendix 1: Timeline

With the approach of the 1876 presidential election, white Democrats in Louisiana flogged blacks, harassed Republicans, and slaughtered elected officials.”²²

1876: “The presidential race of 1876 between Republican Rutherford B. Hayes and his Democratic opponent Samuel J. Tilden was so close that a special commission, comprised of members of the House, the Senate, and the Supreme Court, was required to determine the winner. In return for a Democratic promise not to challenge the commission’s findings, President-elect Hayes, in what can only be described as a ‘back-room deal,’ vowed to remove a large portion of the Army from the South.”²³

June 1878: “The Knott Amendment became known as the Posse Comitatus Act. This amendment passed the House and the Senate as part of the Army appropriations bill, and President Hayes signed it on 18 June 1878. Though a few congressional representatives from Northern and Western states voted for the amendment after witnessing the acts of the Army during labor disputes in 1877, the Southern Democrats carried the amendment through Congress. Consequently, there can be little doubt that the Posse Comitatus Act was a direct result of the Army’s involvement in Reconstruction and the military’s involvement in Grant’s campaign against the Klan.”²⁴

1956: “Congress authorized the president to employ troops domestically under US Code, specifically, Title 10, Sections 331 through 334.”²⁵

1973: “When radical members of the American Indian Movement (AIM) took over a small village on the Pine Ridge Indian Reservation on 27 February 1973, federal law enforcement personnel responded immediately. For two months, federal agents laid siege to the Native American community. During the siege, the US Army and the National Guard of several states supplied equipment and advice to the federal law enforcement agents.”²⁶ “After years of litigation and conflicting court opinions, the South Dakota federal district court in the case of *United States v. Red Feather* clarified the Posse Comitatus Act, determining that military involvement in civil law enforcement operations is either active or passive.”²⁷

The Great Chicago Fire of 1871: “Chicago was a booming industrial revolution town with a hastily designed infrastructure. One-third of the population was left homeless as the conflagration destroyed a majority of the city. The mayor placed an Army lieutenant general in charge of maintaining order in the city. Banking and other private industries in large cities such as New York and Boston had a vested interest in Chicago’s recovery and donated generously. Charitable organizations such as the American Red Cross had not yet formed at this time. Donations came in from throughout the country and were carefully managed through application of St. Paul’s rule: ‘If any man among you will not work, neither let him eat.’ The Federal Government sent little assistance except the Army. Local and state governments were primarily involved. Even though many insurance and legal documents burned in the fire, the insurance industry paid most of the damages. No insurance firm would write a policy in Chicago after the fire until uniform building codes had been established.”²⁸

The 1906 San Francisco Earthquake: “In 1906, San Francisco was the leading Western American city. [Eighty percent] of the city was destroyed by the earthquake and ensuing

Appendix 1: Timeline

conflagration. With local governors and responders largely overwhelmed, a local Army commander took the initiative and mobilized thousands of local troops to assist. The Federal Government appropriated funds, sent more Army units, and tasked the American Red Cross (created in 1881) with overall relief operations. Insurance industry funds were massively depleted because 90% of homes had fire policies. Earthquake and fire resulted in the uniformity of property contracts to avoid disputes, the emergence of international reinsurance firms to cover urban catastrophes, and the subsequent idea of ‘global insurance.’”²⁹

The 1927 Great Mississippi Flood: “600,000 Americans were displaced by the flood, which affected seven states (26,000 square miles). A high level of public awareness regarding flood potential in the months preceding the levee breaks kept casualty figures relatively low. Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoover was given largely unlimited power by President Coolidge to be recovery czar. Hoover’s role set a precedent for Presidential appointees to lead natural disaster recovery efforts. Hoover’s Flood Commission was an efficient and unique blending of public and private organizations, charities, and individuals focused on recovery. Hoover used centralized decision making and decentralized execution to empower local authorities while maintaining overall control. Integration of the American Red Cross and its state and local networks was key to success. African Americans were pressed into levee repair and rebuilding work by local government, highlighting the lack of Federal oversight of state and local disaster response. The magnitude of uninsured losses made some Federal legislators consider federally subsidized flood insurance programs.”³⁰

1930s: Great Depression & Reconstruction Finance Corporation (RFC): “The Great Depression was the first national event that demonstrated a real need for Federal assistance. The banking system was overwhelmed, crops failed across the nation, and, as a result, many fell from affluence into penury. The Federal Government offered loans and assistance to states, localities, businesses, and individuals to help them get back on their feet...During times of significant economic hardship, such as the Great Depression, these expenditures were necessary to stimulate the economy and help the public recover.”³¹

1932: President Hoover created the Reconstruction Finance Corporation “to alleviate pressure on farmers who suffered crop failures during the depression and to restore confidence in the banking system.”³²

1933: “Congress enacted legislation to provide direct assistance to private citizens following an earthquake, and the RFC was authorized to make loans to nonprofit corporations to repair buildings damaged in earthquakes, fires, tornados, or cyclones.”³³

1937: “The Disaster Loan Corporation was formed and financed by the RFC.”³⁴

World War II & Office of Emergency Management: “In the middle of the 20th century, assistance was extended to cover wartime damages incurred from an enemy attack. This extension was a rational one—weapons were getting larger, and the attack on Pearl Harbor proved that the United States was not invulnerable to foreign attack.”³⁵

Appendix 1: Timeline

1940: “The RFC organized subsidiaries to handle national defense and war programs, which procured, stockpiled, and sold strategic materials and commodities, including rubber, metals, and scrap materials. One such subsidiary was the War Damage Corporation.”³⁶

1940: President Roosevelt established the Office for Emergency Management. It assisted and advised the President following “any emergency arising out of war, the threat of war, imminence of war, flood, drought, or other condition threatening the public peace or safety.”³⁷

Federal Disaster Relief Act of 1950: “charged state and local governments with primary responsibility in civil defense but also delineated Federal authorities.²⁴ In 1950, the Federal Disaster Relief Act established a national permanent disaster relief program.²⁵ The law supported the use of Federal funds to supplement state and local resources. The act was implemented by a number of civil defense agencies from 1950 through 1974 and would become the model for later disaster relief legislation.”³⁸

1958: “the Federal Civil Defense Act was amended to make civil defense a “joint responsibility” of the Federal Government and state and local governments. This compact between the Federal Government and citizens allowed the former to pay for the latter’s poor judgment or bad luck.”³⁹

Disaster Relief Act of 1974: “It was the first explicit requirement for mitigation strategies to receive Federal funding. The act also gave the Federal Government the authority to grant direct assistance to individuals and families. When it was first established, the disaster relief act was supposed to be: Limited in the scope of Federal assistance; Contingent upon a presidential disaster declaration that Federal assistance was necessary; and Limited as to amounts of Federal funding allocated to disaster relief.”⁴⁰

Three Mile Island Accident (March 28, 1979): “The accident at the Three Mile Island Unit 2 (TMI-2) nuclear power plant near Middletown, PA., on March 28, 1979, was the most serious in U.S. commercial nuclear power plant operating history, even though it led to no deaths or injuries to plant workers or members of the nearby community...The sequence of certain events – equipment malfunctions, design-related problems and worker errors – led to a partial meltdown of the TMI-2 reactor core but only very small off-site releases of radioactivity.”⁴¹

Creation of Federal Emergency Management Agency (April 1, 1979): “President Carter’s 1979 executive order merged many of the separate disaster-related responsibilities into the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). Among other agencies, FEMA absorbed: the Federal Insurance Administration, the National Fire Prevention and Control Administration, the National Weather Service Community Preparedness Program, the Federal Preparedness Agency of the General Services Administration and the Federal Disaster Assistance Administration activities from HUD. Civil defense responsibilities were also transferred to the new agency from the Defense Department’s Defense Civil Preparedness Agency. John Macy was named as FEMA’s first director. Macy emphasized the similarities between natural hazards preparedness and the civil defense activities. FEMA began development of an Integrated Emergency Management System with an all-hazards approach that included ‘direction, control and warning

systems which are common to the full range of emergencies from small isolated events to the ultimate emergency - war.”⁴²

Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (1988): “The Disaster Relief Act was revised in 1988 and renamed the Stafford Act. According to Congress, it was intended to “provide an orderly and continuing means of assistance by the Federal Government to State and local governments in carrying out their responsibilities to alleviate the suffering and damage which result from disasters....” The Stafford Act broadened the scope of existing disaster relief programs and attempted to encourage comprehensive disaster planning and preparedness by state and local governments, to achieve greater coordination and response, to encourage insurance programs to supplement or replace government assistance, to encourage mitigation, and to provide Federal assistance programs. In 2000, another revision of the Stafford Act, pressure was put on communities to undertake more mitigation. If a disaster occurred in the same place more than once, the recipients of Federal aid for the first occurrence had to prove that they had undertaken mitigation techniques to receive the same percentage of aid; otherwise, the percentage decreased.”⁴³

Los Angeles Riots of 1992 (April 29 – May 4):

Watts Riots of 1965: “With the passage of the Civil Rights Act in 1964, race relations seemed to be headed in the right direction. However, states acted to circumvent the new federal law, including California that created Proposition 13, which moved to block the fair housing section of the Act. This created anger and a feeling of injustice within the inner cities. On August 11, 1965, Los Angeles's South Central neighborhood of Watts became a scene of the greatest example of racial tension America had seen. A Los Angeles police officer pulled over motorist Marquette Frye [who was with his brother Ronald]; he suspected Marquette of driving drunk. While officers questioned them, a crowd of onlookers had begun to form. When Rena Frye, the boys mother showed up, a struggle ensued which led to the arrest of all 3 members of the Frye family. More officers had arrived on the scene and had hit the brothers with their batons. The crowd had grown and by this point had become angry. After the police left the scene, the crowd & tension escalated and sparked the riots, which lasted 6 days. More than 34 people died, 1000 wounded, and an estimated \$50 - \$100 million in property damage.”⁴⁴

March 16, 1991: “[Soon Ja] Du claimed to confront [Latasha] Harlins over a \$1.79 bottle of orange juice sticking outside of her backpack. According to witnesses the argument escalated into slapping and stool-throwing. The security video that captures the incident shows Harlins walking away before Du fatally shot her in the back. The black community was outraged after Du was sentenced on November 15, 1991, to only 5 years probation, community service, and fines after being convicted of voluntary manslaughter.”⁴⁵

Spring 1992: “The tension was heightened by three unrelated accidental killings of babies by gangs in drive-by shootings that spring. There followed a series of meetings by rival gang leaders in churches and celebrities’ homes, anyplace that could be considered neutral territory. Representatives of both the Crips and the Bloods discussed a truce to stop the killing of their babies. More ominous were a series of meetings that occurred during the last week in April. Again involving gangs with longstanding feuds, the meetings were intended to establish a truce so gang members could direct their efforts towards ‘killing a police officer.’”⁴⁶

Appendix 1: Timeline

Wednesday, April 29, 1992:

1245: Notice given to Los Angeles Police Department that a verdict would be announced in two hours.

1515: "Three LAPD officers are acquitted and one is partially acquitted in the videotaped beating of motorist Rodney G. King, setting off a powerful chain reaction."⁴⁷

1520: Crowds begin gathering on Normandie Avenue.

1530-1545: "The crowd outside the Simi Valley courthouse in Ventura County swells to more than 300, most of them protesting the verdicts."⁴⁸

1530-1700: "Community activists and leaders meet to urge calm."⁴⁹

1615: Earliest looting begins to occur.

1700-1800: "More than two dozen officers confront a growing crowd near Florence and Normandie avenues in South-Central Los Angeles. Outnumbered, police back off and do not return. The crowd vents its anger on passing motorists."⁵⁰

1745: Lt. Moulin directs no further dispatches to Normandie.

1800-1900: "Police begin arriving at a command post at a bus depot at 54th Street and Arlington Avenue."⁵¹

1800-2000: "More than 2,000 gather for a peaceful rally at the First African Methodist Episcopal Church."⁵²

1800-2000: "Looting and rioting begin in earnest. One of the first targets: Tom's Liquor and Deli at Florence and Normandie. Demonstrators begin torching buildings in South-Central Los Angeles."⁵³

1825: Chief Daryl Gates attends a fund-raiser.

~1830: "Several hundred demonstrators gather outside Parker Center, the police headquarters, in downtown Los Angeles."⁵⁴

1845: Citywide tactical alert called.⁵⁵

1845: "In one of the most startling images of the riots, truck driver Reginald O. Denny is pulled from his cab and severely beaten. Four people, some of whom saw the beating on TV, come to his aid."⁵⁶

1900-2000: "Police commanders order all officers to report for duty."⁵⁷

1900-2100: "Rioting erupts in Inglewood, prompting officials to declare a state of emergency."⁵⁸

1930-2000: "Los Angeles Unified School District announces plans to close schools in the affected areas."⁵⁹

1945: "The first fire call is received."⁶⁰

2015: First fatality attributed to the riots is a youth shot and killed at Vernon & Vermont when a drug bust goes bad.⁶¹

2045: First report of arson.⁶²

2045: "Mayor Tom Bradley calls a local state of emergency."⁶³

2100: "The California governor's office informs the adjutant general that the governor [Pete Wilson] has decided to mobilize (call to state active duty) 2000 California National Guard (CANG) troops at the request of the LA mayor."⁶⁴

~2100: "Bus service is shut down in portions of South-Central Los Angeles at the request of the LAPD. The restrictions eventually affect 27 bus lines throughout the area."⁶⁵

Appendix 1: Timeline

~2100: "The demonstration outside Parker Center turns violent as the crowd throws rocks, smashes windows and torches a kiosk. Other demonstrators vandalize several downtown buildings and snarl traffic on the Hollywood Freeway (101)."⁶⁶

2105: "The California Highway Patrol closes exit ramps from the Harbor Freeway (110) from the Santa Monica Freeway (10) junction to Century Boulevard to keep unsuspecting motorists from wandering into the path of violence. Eventually the closure is moved south, stretching from Martin Luther King Boulevard to Imperial Highway."⁶⁷

2105: "The Federal Aviation Administration shifts the landing pattern of jetliners approaching LAX for safety reasons, after the LAPD notifies the FAA that a police helicopter was fired upon."⁶⁸

2115: "Major General Robert Thrasher, Adjutant General of the California National Guard, orders the mobilization of 2,000 National Guard troops."⁶⁹

~2115: "About 200 to 300 demonstrators gather at Hansen Dam Recreation Center in Lake View Terrace march to the nearby LAPD Foothill Division headquarters."⁷⁰

2213: "During a conference call of top officials, including Mayor Tom Bradley and Governor Wilson, Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) Chief Daryl Gates and Los Angeles County Sheriff Sherman Block both express doubt over the need for National Guard troops, but welcome the assistance of the California Highway Patrol. Gates turns down Block's offer of 500 sheriff's deputies."⁷¹

2230: "[Mayor] Bradley issues a taped message to the citizens of Los Angeles calling for peace. The message is broadcast later."⁷²

As of 2300: Eight dead and two dozen admitted to ER at Martine Luther King, Jr./Drew Medical Center.⁷³

Thursday, April 30, 1992:

"Thousands loot retail outlets in South-Central Los Angeles, Koreatown, Hollywood, Mid-Wilshire, Watts and Westwood as well as Beverly Hills, Compton, Culver City, Hawthorne, Long Beach, Norwalk and Pomona. Long lines form at supermarkets and gas stations throughout the city as residents, fearing shortages, stock up. Government offices, courthouses, libraries, shopping malls and many businesses are shut down for the day. Cal State Los Angeles, Dominguez Hills and Northridge cancel classes. Final exams are postponed at USC. The Los Angeles Unified School District expands its school closure to include every school and child-care center in the district. Mail service is suspended to 14 ZIP Codes in the hardest-hit areas. Professional sports teams cancel games, including the NBA playoff game between the Clippers and the Utah Jazz, and the matchup between the Dodgers and the Philadelphia Phillies. A power outage leaves thousands of Angelenos in the dark."⁷⁴

0000-0300: "Three new fires per minute are reported, overwhelming the Los Angeles Fire Department."⁷⁵

Midnight: "Gov. Wilson holds a news conference announcing a state of emergency and plans to dispatch the National Guard and the California Highway Patrol. Just after midnight, three people are killed when their car, being chased by Beverly Hills police, hits a fire hydrant and overturns."⁷⁶

0015: "Mayor Bradley declares a dusk-to-dawn curfew for South Central Los Angeles."⁷⁷

0042: Local authorities report there was no need for the National Guard based on poor law enforcement intelligence that portrayed the unrest as a Mardi Gras atmosphere.⁷⁸

Appendix 1: Timeline

0400: "Most of the 2,000 National Guard troops called up by the governor have reported to Los Angeles armories, where they await supplies and ammunition."⁷⁹

0600: "Police Chief Gates arrives at the city's Emergency Operations Center after a night spent viewing the riot areas."⁸⁰

~0800: "Nearly 2,000 National Guard troops are in place at area armories. They spend hours taking refresher courses and waiting for equipment, ammunition and deployment orders from local law enforcement officials."⁸¹

0930: "Bradley, flanked by Fire Chief Donald Manning and Police Chief Daryl F. Gates, holds a news conference on the violence rocking the city."⁸²

1000: "Mayor Bradley informs the City Council that National Guard troops will be on the streets within two hours."⁸³

1007: "A state Office of Emergency Services liaison officer tells the National Guard Emergency Operations Center in Sacramento that Guard troops probably won't need to deploy until 4:00 p.m. General Thrasher of the National Guard tells Sheriff Block that the 2,000 Guard troops in the armories are ready to deploy."⁸⁴

1015: "Bradley expands the curfew to cover more of the area scarred by violence."⁸⁵

1100: General Delk, the Military Field Commander, and Maury Hannigan, Commissioner of the Highway Patrol, flew into Los Alamitos."⁸⁶

1100: "Governor Wilson approves the mobilization of 2,000 additional Guard soldiers. Fire Department Chief Donald Manning convenes a meeting at which the California Highway Patrol offers to provide firefighter escorts."⁸⁷

1130: "In a conference call, Governor Wilson urges Chief Gates and Sheriff Block to deploy Guard troops."⁸⁸

1200: The Sheriff's Department was requesting to put National Guardsmen on the streets."⁸⁹

1200-1500: "The Rapid Transit District announces that all bus service will be suspended as of 6 p.m."⁹⁰

1230: "Mayor Bradley phones Governor Wilson to complain about the delayed deployment of National Guard soldiers."⁹¹

1300-1800: "Smoke along Washington Boulevard becomes so thick that it impairs visibility of Blue Line train operators. Passengers are taken off the train and shuttled by bus from the 7th and Figueroa station to the station at Washington and Long Beach Avenue."⁹²

1320: "General Thrasher learns from the Sheriff's Department that the National Guard troops are still waiting for supplies in order to deploy."⁹³

1330: "Brigadier General James Delk, the National Guard's military field commander, informs the Sheriff's Department that two Guard platoons with borrowed ammunition are ready to deploy."⁹⁴

1350: "Ammunition from Camp Roberts (in central California) arrives in LA area via CH-47 helicopter."⁹⁵

1435: "The two waiting Guard platoons finally deploy with Sheriff's Department escorts. Law enforcement officials agree that the National Guard will be responsible for most Sheriff's Department and LAPD missions, other than escort duty and perimeter control, which are being handled primarily by the California Highway Patrol. Missions are to be coordinated out of the Sheriff's Emergency Operations Center."⁹⁶

1530: "U.S. Atty. Gen. William P. Barr announces that the Justice Department will resume its investigation into possible civil rights violations in the King beating."⁹⁷

Appendix 1: Timeline

1600: "Mayor Bradley extends the dusk-to-dawn curfew to all of Los Angeles."⁹⁸

1630: "Warren Christopher suggests to the mayor's office the possibility of calling in federal troops."⁹⁹

1710: "Wilson holds a news conference, carried live statewide, urging an end to violence and promising enough law enforcement to bring the trouble under control."¹⁰⁰

~1830: "Long Beach declares a state of emergency and imposes a 7 p.m.-6 a.m. curfew. But the move is not enough to protect a Department of Motor Vehicles office that is burned to the ground. Curfews are imposed in Carson, Culver City, Hawthorne, Hermosa Beach, Huntington Park, Inglewood, Pomona, San Fernando, Torrance and West Hollywood. A countywide curfew is imposed from the Long Beach Freeway (710) in the east, the Santa Ana (5) and Santa Monica (10) freeways in the north, the San Diego Freeway (405) in the west and Lomita Boulevard in the south."¹⁰¹

1830: "The California Highway Patrol provides some 300 firefighter escorts, allowing the Fire Department to operate more effectively in riot areas."¹⁰²

1930: "Mayor Bradley asks Warren Christopher to initiate a request for federal troops."¹⁰³

2000: "About 1000 CANG troops are currently deployed 'on the street,' with more than 1000 more prepared to deploy and awaiting mission requests from law enforcement agencies."¹⁰⁴

2200: "Wilson takes a helicopter tour around the perimeter of the troubled area."¹⁰⁵

As of 2300: 25 dead; 572 injured; 1,000 fires; 720 arrests; and \$200-\$250 million in estimated damages."¹⁰⁶

2356: "The LAPD and the Sheriff's Department ask for an additional 2,000 National Guard troops, although hundreds of soldiers were still waiting in armories for missions."¹⁰⁷

Just Before Midnight: "Bradley and Wilson announce they have requested more National Guard troops to bring the Los Angeles County total to 6,000. They also ask the U.S. military to be placed 'on alert.'"¹⁰⁸

Friday, May 1, 1992:

"Cleanup efforts begin along heavily hit Vermont Avenue and other areas, including the Mid-City, Mid-Wilshire and Hollywood sections. In addition to Los Angeles, schools are closed in Beverly Hills, Compton, Inglewood, Long Beach, Lynwood, Paramount and Torrance. Colleges and universities remain closed. Many airlines cancel flights into LAX, and many travelers opt instead to use airports in outlying cities. Up to 25,000 residents still are without electricity."¹⁰⁹

0100: "Governor Wilson submits a formal request to President George Bush for federal troops."¹¹⁰

0115-1730: "Gov. Wilson and Mayor Bradley talk with President George H.W. Bush and other officials in Washington about deployment of federal troops."¹¹¹

0415: The Army's 7th Infantry Division was called to respond to the riots."¹¹²

0515: "The President agrees to deploy 4000 federal troops to LA."¹¹³

0600: The U.S. Marine Corps was called to respond to the riots."¹¹⁴

0630: "Approximately 1220 CANG soldiers are deployed in support of LAPD; 1600 are deployed in support of LASD; and 2700 are in reserve awaiting missions."¹¹⁵

0715: "Officials announce that 3,000 to 4,000 federal troops and 1,000 riot-trained federal law officers will be sent to Los Angeles."¹¹⁶

Appendix 1: Timeline

0730: "After 36 hours, the Los Angeles Fire Department declares the worst of the fires in the riot areas under control."¹¹⁷

~0730: "Three LAPD officers are fired on by a sniper but are not seriously hurt."¹¹⁸

Before 0800: "Hundreds begin crowding South-Central Los Angeles post offices to get mail not delivered to their homes due to the crisis."¹¹⁹

0900: There were 2,000 CA National Guardsmen on the streets with another 2,500 members in reserve.¹²⁰

0930: "Bradley announces that the dusk-to-dawn curfew will be expanded citywide. The directive also prohibits the sale of ammunition and the sale of gasoline except for automobiles."¹²¹

1145: "During a news conference with Patricia Sakai, administrator of the Small Business Administration, Bradley announces that Wilson will seek an official federal disaster declaration from Bush."¹²²

~1300: "More than 1,000 Korean Americans and others gather at a peace rally at Western Avenue and Wilshire Boulevard."¹²³

~1400: "Pomona declares a state of emergency and imposes a dusk-to-dawn curfew."¹²⁴

1427: "More than 3,000 National Guard troops are on the streets performing missions."¹²⁵

1430: "Active component Marines from Camp Pendleton, California, begin arriving in the LA area via convoy."¹²⁶

~1430: "Officials in Washington and Los Angeles announce that a federal grand jury has been convened and indicate that the Justice Department is likely to seek criminal indictments of the four officers involved in the King beating."¹²⁷

1445: "Rodney G. King, the man whose videotaped beating created a national furor over police brutality, breaks his long silence to speak out about the violence inflicted in his name. In a brief emotional statement he asks: 'People ... can we get along?'"¹²⁸

1500-1700: "About 4,000 federal troops, Marines and soldiers begin arriving at Marine Corps Air Stations in Tustin and El Toro."¹²⁹

1630 on 1 May: "[Major General Marvin L. Covault,] Commander, Joint Task Force-Los Angeles (JTF-LA) arrives in LA area."¹³⁰

1730: "Active component soldiers from Ft. Ord, California, begin arriving in the LA area via C-141 aircraft."¹³¹

By 1800: "Most of the 6,000 National Guard troops sent to Los Angeles are deployed."¹³²

1800: "[President] Bush, speaking from the Oval Office, addresses the nation on the violence in Los Angeles and elsewhere. He announces that he will place 6,000 National Guard members under federal control."¹³³

1900: The governor requested federal troops, but they had not arrived into the area.¹³⁴

1900-2400: "The curfew begins to take a heavy toll on area merchants, with some reporting \$40,000 to \$50,000 in losses per day."¹³⁵

2200: "Joint Task Force Commander Major General Marvin Covault tells Chief Gates and Sheriff Block that the mission of federal troops and the National Guard will be to help maintain control, not to perform law enforcement duties."¹³⁶

As of 2300: At least 40 dead; 1,419 injured (159 critical); 4,536 fires; 4,393 arrests; \$500-\$550 million in estimated damages; and 3,100 businesses are affected by rioting or looting.¹³⁷

Appendix 1: Timeline

Saturday, May 2, 1992:

"Legions of volunteers armed with grit, gumption and cleaning supplies hit the streets. The effort attracts residents from all races and all segments of the county. Citizens also pitch in to help direct traffic, hand out food and shuttle residents without bus service. Authorities report no new major fires and few major riot-related criminal incidents for the first time since the violence erupted Wednesday. County officials close an eight-mile stretch of beach in Venice and Playa del Rey. More than 3,500 National Guard troops are on the streets, with another 1,000 in staging areas. Army and Marine forces remain largely in staging areas."¹³⁸

0400: "Final plane with active component soldiers arrives."¹³⁹

0800: "The first of 6,000 alleged looters and arsonists are scheduled to begin appearing in court, but due to the volume of cases, arraignments don't begin until mid-afternoon."¹⁴⁰

1000: "Long Beach City Council meets in emergency session to report on violence there. The tally: one death, 334 injuries and nearly 300 businesses destroyed by fire."¹⁴¹

1100: "Approximately 6150 CANG troops are deployed on the street, with 1000 more in reserve; 1850 soldiers from the 7th Infantry Division are in staging areas; Marines prepare for deployment."¹⁴²

1100: "An estimated 30,000 people march for racial healing and in support of beleaguered merchants in Koreatown."¹⁴³

1130: "Bradley announces that the citywide curfew will be in effect indefinitely."¹⁴⁴

1200: The Rule of Law returned to the area.¹⁴⁵

Afternoon: "Federal troops deploy to Compton, Long Beach, Watts, and Huntington Park."¹⁴⁶

1600: "The first Marine Corps units arrive in Compton."¹⁴⁷

1715: "Bradley names former Olympics organizer Peter V. Ueberroth to serve as the unpaid "czar" for the Rebuild L.A. effort. At the same news conference, Gov. Wilson announces that President Bush has declared Los Angeles a disaster area."¹⁴⁸

1840: "Bradley signs an executive order prohibiting landlords from imposing late fees on renters unable to withdraw money from damaged banks."¹⁴⁹

1900: "First active component troops deploy on the street; a battalion of Marines replaces 600 CANG soldiers."¹⁵⁰

As of 2300: At least 45 dead; 2,116 injured (211 critical); 5,534 fires; 7,495 arrests; \$550 million in estimated damages; and 3,100 businesses are affected by rioting or looting.¹⁵¹

2359: "More than 6900 CANG soldiers are deployed, with 2700 more in reserve. Approximately 600 Marines are deployed, but most active component Army and Marine Corps personnel remain in staging areas."¹⁵²

Sunday, May 3, 1992:

"Delivering homilies at churches throughout the area, including South-Central, Cardinal Roger M. Mahony urges looters to return stolen merchandise. Ueberroth and Wilson take separate tours of riot-damaged sections of Los Angeles County. Police acting on tips recover truckloads of looted merchandise. Federal authorities announce that the FBI and U.S. attorney general's office will investigate the torching of Korean-owned businesses and the attack on Denny, the truck driver. The South Korean Foreign Ministry announces that its government will send a delegation to Los Angeles to seek reparation for Korean American merchants who suffered damage during the unrest. Federal, state and local emergency officials announce that

Appendix 1: Timeline

one-stop disaster-assistance centers will open by week's end. Many school districts, including Los Angeles, Inglewood and Beverly Hills, announce that classes will resume Monday. Normal class schedules also are announced for USC and University of California campuses. Democratic presidential hopeful Bill Clinton arrives in Los Angeles to meet with community leaders and to inspect the hard-hit areas. Authorities reveal that most of the 1,200 backup federal law enforcement officers will leave Monday. Nearly 8,500 members of the Marines, Army and National Guard are posted throughout the county."¹⁵³

0600: "RTD resumes some service into South-Central Los Angeles during the day."¹⁵⁴

Morning: "A combined force of more than 13,000 National Guard troops, federal soldiers, and federal officers are deployed in and around Los Angeles."¹⁵⁵

0955: Mutual Aid (a civilian system to get additional fire department or law enforcement help from surrounding agencies in California) was withdrawn.¹⁵⁶

~1030: "The Rev. Jesse Jackson meets with leaders in Koreatown to urge an end to animosity between African American and Korean American communities."¹⁵⁷

1045: "L.A. County Sheriff Sherman Block calls for federal prosecution of those who targeted Korean American merchants and beat a white truck driver during the unrest."¹⁵⁸

1130: "Bradley announces that he is lifting the dusk-to-dawn curfew on Monday. He says he expects inquiries into LAPD and National Guard delays in responding to the crisis."¹⁵⁹

1206: The California Highway Patrol was demobilized.¹⁶⁰

1300: "Harbor Freeway (110) off-ramps are reopened."¹⁶¹

1600: "The number of inmates at the County Jail tops a record 25,000."¹⁶²

1950: "National Guard members shoot a motorist they say was trying to run them down. The man, a Latino, dies at 10:05 p.m. It is the first use of deadly force by the Guard since troops' arrival Thursday."¹⁶³

As of 2300: At least 51 dead; 2,328 injured (228 critical); 6,405 fires; 10,164 arrests; \$717 million in estimated damages; and 3,100 businesses are affected by rioting or looting.¹⁶⁴

Monday, May 4, 1992:

"Bill Clinton and Republican presidential candidate Patrick Buchanan tour Koreatown. Korean American business community leaders map a strategy for helping members recover. Several financial institutions, including Bank of America, American Savings Bank, Wells Fargo, First Interstate and Glendale Federal, announce assistance programs for businesses and homeowners in areas damaged during the riots. Despite mounting criticism, LAPD Chief Gates defends his conduct in planning and coping with the disturbance, particularly in its early stages. Federal law enforcement experts sent to Los Angeles are sent home, as are many police officers and sheriff's deputies from elsewhere in the Southland. Aided by additional tips from residents, police continue to recover stolen merchandise. Homicide detectives from the LAPD's Rampart Division launch an investigation into the shooting death of a motorist killed Sunday after he allegedly tried to run down a Guard member."¹⁶⁵

0600: "The dusk-to-dawn curfew, imposed at the height of the rioting, ends. RTD resumes its full normal schedule citywide."¹⁶⁶

0630: "Normal arrivals departures resume at LAX."¹⁶⁷

0700: "General Covault ends day patrols on the part of state and federal troops, relegating them to a "less visible" backup role."¹⁶⁸

Appendix 1: Timeline

0700-0900: “Thousands queue up at state employment offices. Economists estimate that 20,000 to 40,000 people were put out of work when their places of business were looted or burned.”¹⁶⁹

0710: “Los Angeles returns to work, school and the malls.”¹⁷⁰

0800: “White House officials announce that the federal government will make available \$600 million—half in SBA loans and half in cash grants—to help repair damage. The Bush administration also sends a team of officials to the city to assess needs.”¹⁷¹

1115: “State Sen. Art Torres (D-Los Angeles) proposes a 1/4-cent sales tax boost to fund rebuilding and to generate funds for earthquake relief.”¹⁷²

1630: “Gov. Wilson meets privately with 16 California corporate executives, including representatives of four major financial institutions and three large supermarket chains.”¹⁷³

1715: “Mayor Bradley lifts the dusk-to-dawn curfew, signaling the official end of the riots.”¹⁷⁴

As of 2300: At least 58 dead; 2,383 injured (228 critical); 7,000 fires; 12,111 arrests; \$717 million in estimated damages; and 3,100 businesses are affected by rioting or looting. The death toll and damage estimates are adjusted to 54 and ~\$1 billion, respectively.¹⁷⁵

Tuesday, May 5, 1992:

“General Covault continues the disengagement of state and federal troops.”¹⁷⁶

Saturday, May 9, 1992:

1200: “CANG reverts to state status, ending federalization; active component forces begin redeploying home.”¹⁷⁷

Wednesday, May 13, 1992:

“The first National Guard troops begin to withdraw.”¹⁷⁸

Wednesday, May 27, 1992:

“The last National Guard soldiers depart Los Angeles.”¹⁷⁹

9/11 Terrorist Attacks (September 11, 2001): “Nearly 3,000 killed in a devastating attack on New York City’s financial district and the Pentagon. Short-term impact only for New York City financial district tenants, as they quickly moved to planned alternative locations. Long-term impact on the insurance industry, prompting passage of [the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act]. Government-coordinated dispensation of benefits through the Victim Compensation Fund. Coordination of compensation mechanisms was a significant issue. Hundreds of new charities were created after 9/11, and existing charities moved quickly to fill gaps left by government and the insurance industry. Extensive government involvement in all compensation mechanisms. Resilience of the financial system was impressive and a model for other critical infrastructure sectors. Insurance paid out claims, but may not have been prepared to handle a second catastrophe in quick succession.”¹⁸⁰

Creation of Department of Homeland Security (2001-2003): “The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and subsequent anthrax attacks caused another major overhaul of disaster preparedness and response agencies. The Office of Homeland Security and the Homeland Security Council were created October 8, 2001, within the Executive Office of the President

Appendix 1: Timeline

under the Direction of Tom Ridge. Two years later, the Department of Homeland Security was created as a coordinating agency, and FEMA was integrated into its super organization.”¹⁸¹

February 2001: “the U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century (Hart-Rudman Commission) issued its Phase III Report, recommending significant and comprehensive institutional and procedural changes throughout the executive and legislative branches in order to meet future national security challenges. Among these recommendations was the creation of a new National Homeland Security Agency to consolidate and refine the missions of the different departments and agencies that had a role in U.S. homeland security.”¹⁸²

September 20, 2001: “Eleven days after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, President George W. Bush announced that he would create an Office of Homeland Security in the White House and appoint Pennsylvania Governor Tom Ridge as the director. The office would oversee and coordinate a comprehensive national strategy to safeguard the country against terrorism, and respond to any future attacks.”¹⁸³

October 8, 2001: “Executive Order 13228, issued on October 8, 2001, established two entities within the White House to determine homeland security policy: the Office of Homeland Security (OHS) within the Executive Office of the President, tasked to develop and implement a national strategy to coordinate federal, state, and local counter-terrorism efforts to secure the country from and respond to terrorist threats or attacks, and the Homeland Security Council (HSC), composed of Cabinet members responsible for homeland security-related activities, was to advise the President on homeland security matters, mirroring the role the National Security Council (NSC) plays in national security.”¹⁸⁴

November 25, 2002: The Homeland Security Act of 2002 is signed into law authorizing the creation of the Department of Homeland Security.¹⁸⁵

January 24, 2003: “The Department of Homeland Security became operational.”¹⁸⁶

March 1, 2003: “Marks the official inception date of the Department of Homeland Security. On that date, the majority of the previously existing agencies, such as the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), the Coast Guard, the Customs Service, and the United States Secret Service transferred to the new department.”¹⁸⁷

Hurricane Katrina (August 23-30, 2005):

“Katrina was an extraordinarily powerful and deadly hurricane that carved a wide swath of catastrophic damage and inflicted large loss of life. It was the costliest and one of the five deadliest hurricanes to ever strike the United States. Katrina first caused fatalities and damage in southern Florida as a Category 1 hurricane on the Saffir-Simpson Hurricane Scale. After reaching Category 5 intensity over the central Gulf of Mexico, Katrina weakened to Category 3 before making landfall on the northern Gulf coast. Even so, the damage and loss of life inflicted by this massive hurricane in Louisiana and Mississippi were staggering, with significant effects extending into the Florida panhandle, Georgia, and Alabama. Considering the scope of its impacts, Katrina was one of the most devastating natural disasters in United States history.”¹⁸⁸

Appendix 1: Timeline

Tuesday, August 23, 2005:

1700: "The National Hurricane Center in Miami, Florida, issues its first advisory about the tropical system that will become Hurricane Katrina. The advisory notes that the season's 12th tropical depression has formed over the Bahamas. The weather system is about 350 miles (560 kilometers) east of Miami."¹⁸⁹

Wednesday, August 24, 2005:

1100: "The storm has strengthened, become more organized, and been given a name. It is now tropical storm Katrina, the 11th named storm of 2005, about 230 miles (370 kilometers) east of Miami. Its strongest winds are blowing at about 40 miles an hour (65 kilometers an hour)."¹⁹⁰

Thursday, August 25, 2005:

1700: "Katrina has continued to strengthen and is now a hurricane. Its strongest winds are about 75 miles an hour (120 kilometers an hour), making it a Category One hurricane. The storm is about 15 miles (25 kilometers) east of Fort Lauderdale, Florida, and about to make landfall."¹⁹¹

1900: "The eye of Hurricane Katrina comes ashore between North Miami Beach and Hallandale Beach on Florida's southeastern coast. The storm's top winds are 80 miles an hour (130 kilometers an hour). Falling trees kill two people."¹⁹²

Friday, August 26, 2005:

- "Governors Kathleen Blanco of Louisiana and Haley Barbour of Mississippi declare states of emergency in their respective states."¹⁹³

- "White House declares impending disaster area. Orders FEMA and DHS to prepare. 10,000 National Guard troops dispatched along Gulf Coast (arrival time unclear)."¹⁹⁴

0100: "Katrina weakens and is reclassified as a tropical storm. Its center is about 45 miles (70 kilometers) northwest of Key Largo, Florida. Its strongest winds are about 70 miles an hour (115 kilometers an hour)."¹⁹⁵

0300: "The storm's center has emerged from the Florida peninsula and starts strengthening almost immediately as it touches the warm waters of the Gulf of Mexico."¹⁹⁶

0500: "Katrina reintensifies into a hurricane. Its strongest winds are about 75 miles an hour (120 kilometers an hour), and its eye is about 70 miles (115 kilometers) northwest of Key Largo. Keys residents are surprised by Katrina's strength as it passes offshore."¹⁹⁷

0500: "Louisiana Governor Kathleen Babineaux Blanco declares a state of emergency for Louisiana."¹⁹⁸

1130: "The National Hurricane Center reports that the hurricane is 'rapidly strengthening' as it crosses the Gulf of Mexico's very warm waters. In only a few hours, the storm's strongest winds have increased to about a hundred miles an hour (160 kilometers an hour)."¹⁹⁹

2300: "The National Hurricane Center predicts that Katrina will become a major hurricane by the time it reaches the central Gulf of Mexico. The eye of the storm is now about 460 miles (740 kilometers) southeast of the mouth of the Mississippi River in Louisiana."²⁰⁰

Saturday, August 27, 2005:

Appendix 1: Timeline

"Governor Blanco asks President Bush to declare a Federal state of emergency in LA. Several hours later, he does so."²⁰¹

0500: "Katrina's strongest winds have reached 115 miles an hour (185 kilometers an hour), making it a Category Three hurricane."²⁰²

0900: "People in [Louisiana] begin coastal evacuations."²⁰³

1000: "A hurricane watch was initially issued for the Louisiana coast from Morgan City to the mouth of the Pearl River at the Mississippi border, on 27 August at 1500 UTC, approximately 44 hours in advance of the initial Louisiana landfall of the center of Katrina."²⁰⁴

1600: "The state implements the contraflow plan."²⁰⁵

1700: "New Orleans Mayor C. Ray Nagin declares a State of Emergency and issues a voluntary evacuation order, saying he is having his legal team determine if he can order a mandatory evacuation without exposing the city to legal liability for the closure of hotels and other businesses."²⁰⁶

1800: "Weather Service Prediction: 45% chance that a Cat 4 or 5 storm will hit New Orleans directly."²⁰⁷

2200: A Hurricane Warning was issued from Morgan City, Louisiana, to the Florida/Alabama border."²⁰⁸

Sunday, August 28, 2005:

"FEMA sends water, food and supplies to Georgia and Texas in preparation."²⁰⁹

0115: "The [Louisiana Defense Coordinating Element] (12 members) drives to Houston."²¹⁰

0200: "Hurricane Katrina's winds have increased to 145 miles an hour (235 kilometers an hour), making it a Category Four storm. The eye of the storm is about 310 miles (500 kilometers) south of the mouth of the Mississippi River."²¹¹

0700: "Katrina becomes Cat 5 storm with 160 mph winds."²¹²

0800: "The Superdome opens as a 'shelter of last resort' for the general public."²¹³

0930: "New Orleans Mayor Ray Nagin issues a mandatory evacuation order. Tens of thousands of New Orleans residents begin streaming out of the city."²¹⁴

0930: "Nagin announces that Regional Transit Authority (RTA) buses will pick up people in 12 locations throughout the city to take them to places of refuge, including the Superdome. The New Orleans Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan calls for buses to evacuate citizens out of the city (this component not in effect)."²¹⁵

1100: "Hurricane Katrina has mushroomed into one of the most powerful hurricanes ever to form in the Atlantic. The storm's strongest winds are blowing at about 175 miles an hour (280 kilometers an hour), making it a Category Five storm. The center of the storm is about 225 miles (360 kilometers) from the mouth of the Mississippi River."²¹⁶

1100: "Ten shelters set up for those unable to leave (Nagin referred to them as "refuges of last resort" rather than shelters). Evacuation orders posted all along coast. President Bush suggests mandatory evacuation after decision was already made, but before it was reported to the public."²¹⁷

1200: "Highways packed. City activates contraflow traffic system so some highways become one-way only."²¹⁸

1300: Hurricane Katrina peaked with a maximum sustained winds of 150 knots. It was 170 nautical miles southeast of the mouth of the Mississippi River, and its hurricane-force winds extended out 90 nautical miles from its center."²¹⁹

Appendix 1: Timeline

1500: "Superdome has 10,000 people inside. 150 National Guardsmen stationed (~2/3 unarmed)."²²⁰

1700: "Contraflow evacuation operations end."²²¹

1700: "'Some levees in the greater New Orleans area could be overtopped,' the [National Hurricane] center warns. 'Significant storm surge flooding will occur elsewhere along the central and northeastern Gulf of Mexico coast.'"²²²

1800: "Nagin orders a curfew of 6 PM."²²³

1900: "National Weather Service predicts the levees may be 'overtopped' due to storm surge."²²⁴

Night: "Thousands of New Orleans residents who are unable to leave town or have chosen not to leave seek shelter in the Louisiana Superdome."²²⁵

Monday, August 29, 2005:

Hurricane Katrina made landfall as a Category 3 hurricane, but it still remained a very large storm. As it moved over land, it continued to weaken.²²⁶ "Breaches along the Industrial Canal east of downtown New Orleans, the London Avenue Canal north of downtown, and the 17th Street Canal northwest of downtown appear to have occurred during the early morning... Overall, about 80% of the city of New Orleans flooded, to varying depths up to about 20 ft, within a day or so after landfall of the eye."²²⁷

During Day: "NORTHCOM activates its battle staff."²²⁸

Throughout Day: "The Army National Guard positions 65 helicopters—42 UH-60s, 8 UH-1s, and 15 CH-47s—in MS, LA, FL, TX, and AL to support relief operations... First out-of-state forces arrive in LA (2 Blackhawks from OK) and MS (2 Blackhawks from AR)."²²⁹

0200: "Hurricane Katrina turns north toward the Louisiana coast, but the storm's strongest winds have diminished slightly to about 155 miles an hour (250 kilometers an hour). The center of the storm is about 130 miles (210 kilometers) from New Orleans. A weather buoy about 50 miles (80 kilometers) east of the river's mouth reports waves at least 40 feet (12 meters) high."²³⁰

0500: "The hurricane's strongest winds are now about 150 miles an hour (240 kilometers an hour), and its eye is about 90 miles (145 kilometers) from New Orleans and about 120 miles (195 kilometers) from Biloxi."²³¹

0610: "Katrina, a Category 4 hurricane with 145 mph winds, makes initial landfall near Buras, LA."²³²

0700: "Hurricane Katrina's eye is about to come ashore in Plaquemines Parish, Louisiana. The hurricane's strongest winds are about 145 miles an hour (235 kilometers an hour). The eye is about 70 miles (115 kilometers) from New Orleans."²³³

~0800: "Storm surge sends water over the Industrial Canal. Soon afterwards, Army Corps of Engineers officials believe 'a barge broke loose and crashed through the floodwall, opening a breach that accelerated flooding into the Lower Ninth Ward and St. Bernard Parish.'"²³⁴

0800: "Mayor Ray Nagin reports that water is flowing over one of New Orleans's levees."²³⁵

0814: "The National Weather Service New Orleans office issues a flash flood warning stating there had been a breach in the Industrial Canal levee with 3 to 8 feet of water expected in the 9th Ward and Arabi."²³⁶

Appendix 1: Timeline

0900: "The eye is about 40 miles (65 kilometers) from New Orleans and is expected to pass just to the east of the city. The storm's strongest winds are about 135 miles an hour (215 kilometers an hour)."²³⁷

0900: "Lower 9th Ward Levee reportedly breached. Floodwaters 6-8 feet in this area."²³⁸

1100: "The hurricane's eye comes ashore again near the Louisiana-Mississippi border. The storm's strongest winds are about 125 miles an hour (200 kilometers an hour). Katrina's front-right quadrant—which contains its strongest winds and peak storm surge—slams into Biloxi and Gulfport, Mississippi, with devastating force, destroying much of both cities. Meanwhile, a major levee in New Orleans has failed. Water is pouring through the 17th Street Canal, and the city is beginning to flood."²³⁹

~1100: "FEMA Director Michael Brown dispatches 1000 employees 5 hours after landfall - gives them 2 days to arrive. Brown arrives in Baton Rouge at the State Office of Emergency Preparedness."²⁴⁰

1300: "Hurricane Katrina continues to weaken as it moves farther inland. Its strongest winds are about 105 miles an hour (170 kilometers an hour)."²⁴¹

1400: "City Hall confirms 17th Street levee breach. Floods ~ 20% of the city."²⁴²

1500: "The center of the hurricane is about 20 miles (30 kilometers) west of Hattiesburg, Mississippi. Its winds are down to about 95 miles an hour (155 kilometers an hour)."²⁴³

Tuesday, August 30, 2005:

- "Floodwaters continue to pour into New Orleans from breaks in the city's levees."²⁴⁴
- "An estimated 50,000-100,000 remain in New Orleans on roofs, the Superdome, and the convention center. The convention center was discussed as a possible option for refugees by New Orleans officials, but it was never officially chosen as a place of refuge. It was not a shelter listed in the New Orleans Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan. Unclear as to why it became a shelter."²⁴⁵

- "Superdome damaged (with 10,000 people inside). Refineries damaged, and eight refineries closed. Airports close."²⁴⁶

- "Conditions deteriorate in the Superdome when the plumbing fails."²⁴⁷

- "Airport officials report that the Louis Armstrong International Airport in New Orleans has limited VFR only capabilities."²⁴⁸

- "Secretary Michael Chertoff, Department of Homeland Security, declares Hurricane Katrina an incident of national significance...[He] designates Michael Brown, Director of FEMA, as the principal Federal official."²⁴⁹

- "FEMA activates the National Response Plan to fully mobilize federal government's resources."²⁵⁰

- "FEMA stops volunteer firefighters with hurricane expertise due to the insecurity of the city. Asks them to wait for National Guardsmen to secure city first."²⁵¹

- "Neighboring states, acting on existing [Emergency Management Assistance Compact] agreements, begin supplying troops and equipment to LA, MS, and AL."²⁵²

- "[Mississippi] officials report that one of their biggest commodity shortfalls is fuel...[They] voice concern that they are not receiving the same level of support as Louisiana."²⁵³

- "Acting Deputy Secretary of Defense Gordon England gives NORTHCOM blanket authority ("blank check") to provide whatever military assistance is needed to the affected states...NORTHCOM establishes JTF *Katrina* and assigns LTG Honoré as the

Appendix 1: Timeline

commander...LTG Russel L. Honoré drives to Camp Shelby, MS. Later that afternoon, he drives to Gulfport and meets with the governor and adjutant general.”²⁵⁴

Throughout Day: “Coast Guard rescues 1200 from flood; National Guard called in.”²⁵⁵

0700: Hurricane Katrina became a tropical depression.”²⁵⁶

1100: “The National Hurricane Center issues its last advisory on the storm that once was Hurricane Katrina. The storm has maximum winds of about 35 miles an hour (55 kilometers an hour), and its center is dumping heavy rainfall on Tennessee.”²⁵⁷

Afternoon: “FEMA issues statement asking first responders to only come to the city if there was proper coordination between the state and local officials.”²⁵⁸

1345: “President Bush declares Emergency Disaster for Louisiana and Mississippi. Frees up federal funds.”²⁵⁹

1630: “Officials call for anyone with boats to help with rescue mission.”²⁶⁰

1830: “Nagin issues urgent bulletin that waters will continue to rise - 12-15 feet in some places. He reports that pumps will soon fail.”²⁶¹

2010: “Reports suggest looting is widespread.”²⁶²

2055: “Army Corps of Engineers begin work on 17th St levee.”²⁶³

2200: “10:00 PM CDT: New Orleans Mayor Ray Nagin announces that the planned sandbagging of the 17th Street Canal levee breach has failed.”²⁶⁴

2215: “Gov. Blanco orders an evacuation of the Superdome. She sets no timetable.”²⁶⁵

Wednesday, August 31, 2005:

- Tropical Depression Katrina became a low pressure system and was absorbed into a frontal zone.”²⁶⁶

- “President Bush flies over the region to survey the damage.”²⁶⁷

- “FEMA sends a mission assignment requesting buses to the Department of Transportation. The first buses arrive in the evening and are used to evacuate special needs patients to Houston.”²⁶⁸ “Military transport planes take seriously ill and injured to Houston.”²⁶⁹

- “The Corps of Engineers attempts to close the 17th Street Canal breach.”²⁷⁰

- “The chief of the National Guard Bureau exhorts all state adjutant generals to send as many troops and as much equipment to LA and MS as they can.”²⁷¹

- “Governor Blanco asks LTG Honoré to coordinate the evacuation of the Superdome. LTG Honoré hands the assignment to BG Mark Graham, Deputy Commander of the US Fifth Army, who had just arrived in New Orleans.”²⁷²

- “LTG Honoré directs the AL [Defense Coordinating Officer], COL Young, to move forward to Gulfport.”²⁷³

- “Health and Human Services Secretary Michael O. Leavitt declares a public health emergency in Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, and Florida. Meanwhile, Louisiana Governor Kathleen Blanco orders that all remaining residents leave New Orleans. But buses and trucks aren't available to carry out the order.”²⁷⁴

- “President Bush authorizes draw of oil from Strategic Petroleum Reserve. Gas prices rise above \$3/gal (from average of \$2.60 to \$3.20).”²⁷⁵

- “Pentagon sends four Navy ships with emergency supplies. Launches search-and-rescue mission.”²⁷⁶

- “Water level stops rising in New Orleans.”²⁷⁷

- “Looting grows exponentially. Police forced to focus on violence/looting rather than search and rescue.”²⁷⁸

Appendix 1: Timeline

- "London Avenue canal breached."²⁷⁹
- "FEMA deploys 39 medical teams and 1700 trailer trucks."²⁸⁰

Morning: "Gov. Blanco requests more National Guardsmen from President Bush. Orders total evacuation of city."²⁸¹ "Governor Blanco and President Bush discuss military assistance and the need for a unified command structure."²⁸²

1000: "Texas Governor spokesperson says that Superdome refugees will be put in Astrodome."²⁸³ "TX officials prepare the Astrodome to accept up to 23,000 evacuees."²⁸⁴ "[Buses start evacuating] Superdome: 25,000 people in Superdome & 52,000 people in Red Cross shelters."²⁸⁵

1230: "Refugees begin arriving in Houston at the Astrodome."²⁸⁶

Evening: "Furious at a rising tide of lawlessness in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, New Orleans Mayor Ray Nagin Wednesday evening reassigned 1,500 New Orleans police from search-and-rescue missions to halt widespread looting in the battered and flooded city. Declaring 'martial law' in a dramatic invocation of his civic emergency powers, he directed officers to do 'whatever it takes' to restore order, saying they could stop looters without regard to their civil rights and Miranda rights."²⁸⁷

2309: "The Times-Picayune reports that 3,000 or more evacuees are stranded at the convention center."²⁸⁸

Thursday, September 1, 2005:

- "FEMA requests that DOD take responsibility for providing "full logistics support" across the entire area affected by Hurricane Katrina. The cost estimate for this support was set at \$1 billion."²⁸⁹

- "Military increases National Guard deployment to 30,000. Violence, carjacking, looting continues. Military helicopters shot at while evacuating residents. FEMA water rescue operations suspended because of gunfire."²⁹⁰

- "The National Guard begins deploying MPs to New Orleans. The first of three 1,400 MP contingents arrive."²⁹¹

- "Three CH-47s and 12 UH-60s from the 4th Infantry Division begin operations in LA."²⁹²

- "President Bush appoints George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton to fundraise for hurricane victims."²⁹³

- "Halliburton awarded Navy contract for storm cleanup."²⁹⁴

- "Sandbags arrive for levees."²⁹⁵

- "Superdome and Convention Center now housing up to 45,000 refugees."²⁹⁶

- "Senators return from recess to begin work on emergency aid bill."²⁹⁷

- "DHS Secretary Chertoff states in an interview that he was not aware of the people at the convention center until recently."²⁹⁸

1000: "Superdome evacuation begins."²⁹⁹

1400: "On national television New Orleans Mayor Ray Nagin issues a "desperate SOS" for help from the federal government. Nagin says there's no food for those who took shelter at the Louisiana Superdome and New Orleans convention center."³⁰⁰

2200: "Brown states (on Paula Zahn's show) that he became aware of the convention center problem only a few hours before."³⁰¹

Friday, September 2, 2005:

Appendix 1: Timeline

- "A convoy of U.S. National Guard troops and supply trucks arrives in New Orleans and distributes food and water to residents stranded at the Superdome and convention center. Congress approves 10.5 billion dollars (U.S.) in aid for Hurricane Katrina rescue and relief, and President George W. Bush signs the bill. The work of repairing the city's levees, pumping out the floodwaters, and finding homes for tens of thousands of displaced residents is underway."³⁰²
- "President Bush and Governor Blanco meet in LA and discuss command and control issues."³⁰³ "President Bush tours Gulf area. Acknowledges failures of government. Calls the results 'not acceptable.'"³⁰⁴
- "MS officials warn that the commodity situation in the state is critical."³⁰⁵
- "National Guard troops restore order at the Convention Center."³⁰⁶
- "The White House faxes a dual-hat proposal to Governor Blanco."³⁰⁷
- "Air evacuations begin from the New Orleans International Airport."³⁰⁸
- "St. Bernard and 9th Ward levee breaches are closed."³⁰⁹
- "FEMA requests DOD assistance with logistics distribution in MS."³¹⁰
- "Another 1,400 Army National Guard MPs arrive in New Orleans."³¹¹ "More National Guardsmen arrive; 6,500 arrive New Orleans, 20,000 by day's end in LA and MS."³¹²
- "U.S. and Europe tap oil and gas reserves (2 million barrels a day)."³¹³
- "A chemical plant explosion rocks New Orleans in the early hours of the morning. Rumors that the chemical cloud produced by the explosion was toxic were later determined not to be credible."³¹⁴
- "Explosions at chemical storage plant in New Orleans. Scattered fires."³¹⁵
- "The Congressional Black Caucus, along with the NAACP, Black Leadership Forum, and the National Urban League express dismay over the sluggish relief efforts in New Orleans, citing the poverty of the victims as a primary reason for the delay."³¹⁶
- "The Reliant Center in Houston is opened to evacuees when the Fire Marshal declares the Astrodome to be at capacity."³¹⁷
- "Fifteen airlines begin flying refugees out of New Orleans to San Antonio."³¹⁸
- "The Bush administration asks Louisiana Governor Kathleen Blanco to request a federal takeover of relief efforts. The move would have given the federal government control over Louisiana's National Guard and local police. The state eventually rejected the proposal."³¹⁹

Saturday, September 3, 2005:

- "Governor Blanco rejects the dual-hat proposal."³²⁰
- "President Bush announces the deployment of 7,200 Title 10 troops to the Gulf region."³²¹
- "The 3rd Brigade and 319th Field Artillery Regiment from the 82nd Airborne Division deploy to New Orleans."³²²
- "The 2nd Brigade/1st Cavalry Division deploys to Hammond, LA."³²³
- "Evacuation operations begin at the Convention Center and are completed by early evening."³²⁴
- "The Superdome evacuation is complete."³²⁵
- "All hospitals in New Orleans have been evacuated."³²⁶
- "The last of the 1,400 Army National Guard MPs arrive in New Orleans."³²⁷
- "40,000 National Guardsmen now on Gulf Coast."³²⁸
- "U.S. Labor Department announces emergency grant of \$62 million for dislocated workers."³²⁹

Appendix 1: Timeline

- "New Orleans police report 200 officers have walked off the job, 2 committed suicide."³³⁰
- "Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff declares that Katrina constituted "a combination of catastrophes exceeded the foresight of the planners, and maybe anybody's foresight." CNN reports that "government officials, scientists and journalists have warned of such a scenario for years." Chertoff also asserts that "our constitutional system really places the primary authority in each state with the governor," in response to a question about the federal government's response to the catastrophe."³³¹
- "Governor Kathleen Blanco (D-La) hires James Lee Witt, FEMA director under President Clinton, to advise her during the relief effort."³³²
- "DHS Secretary Michael Chertoff and other Bush aides hold two hour meeting with members of the Congressional Black Caucus and other black leaders."³³³

Sunday, September 4, 2005:

- "The Corps of Engineers closes the mouth of the 17th Street Canal using sheet pilings."³³⁴
- "The 82nd Airborne continues to flow into New Orleans."³³⁵
- "Superdome fully evacuated (except stragglers)."³³⁶
- "Gov. Blanco declares State of Public Health Emergency."³³⁷
- "Carnival Cruise offers cruise ships for 7000 victims."³³⁸
- "Jefferson Parish president Aaron Broussard claims on Meet the Press that aid to his Parish was blocked by FEMA."³³⁹
- "The *Chicago Tribune* reports that the USS Bataan, a large navy ship positioned close to New Orleans, is "underused and waiting for a larger role in the effort," with its 600 beds and six medical operating rooms empty. The *Tribune* notes that the ship's 1,200 sailors have not been asked to join the relief effort."³⁴⁰

0800: "The last group of evacuees depart the Louis Armstrong International Airport."³⁴¹

Monday, September 5, 2005:

- "Carnival Cruise offers cruise ships for 7,000 victims."³⁴²
- "The 82nd Airborne assumes control of the Convention Center."³⁴³
- "The chief of the National Guard Bureau asks the Secretary of Defense to convert all National Guard troops to Title 32 status."³⁴⁴
- "The 4th Brigade/4th Mountain Division sends 65 trucks and drivers to New Orleans."³⁴⁵
- "DOD delivers 320 tons of MREs to Gulfport, MS."³⁴⁶
- "About 120 soldiers from the 4th Psychological Operations Group arrive at Camp Shelby to provide public information support using man-portable and vehicle-mounted loudspeakers."³⁴⁷
- "Gap in levee closed. Still repairing another gap."
- "Bush returns to the region. 4,700 more active duty troops dispatched."³⁴⁸
- "Former Presidents George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton announce hurricane fund."³⁴⁹
- "500 New Orleans officers unaccounted for."³⁵⁰
- "Some refineries restart production."³⁵¹
- "Other countries frustrated with relief efforts of their citizens (Europe, Canada, S. Korea, etc)"³⁵²

Appendix 1: Timeline

Tuesday, September 6, 2005:

- "The general search-and-rescue mission in New Orleans is complete. Officials are now implementing a more deliberate and detailed search-and-rescue mission."³⁵³
- "The Corps of Engineers closes the 17th Street Canal breach."³⁵⁴
- "The Corps of Engineers makes three deliberate breaches in levees in St. Bernard Parish to facilitate natural drainage."³⁵⁵
- "Approximately 1,700 paratroopers from the 82nd Airborne Division arrive in New Orleans."³⁵⁶
- "Approximately 1,700 soldiers from the 1st Cavalry Division arrive in New Orleans."³⁵⁷
- "DOD delivers 1,500 [land mobile radios] to New Orleans."³⁵⁸
- "Executive and legislative branches pledge separate investigations into federal response."³⁵⁹
- "US Army Corps of Engineers begins pumping New Orleans. Now 60% underwater."³⁶⁰
- "Less than 10,000 people still in New Orleans. Streets secure. Four fires."³⁶¹
- "FEMA: Victims will be given debit cards for necessities."³⁶²
- "Labor Department pledges \$62 million for Louisiana, \$50 million for Mississippi, \$75 million for refugees in Texas, and \$4 million for Alabama for dislocated workers."³⁶³

Wednesday, September 7, 2005:

- "Secondary searches begin."³⁶⁴
- "Mayor Nagin announces that he will forcibly evacuate residents who refuse to leave the city."³⁶⁵
- "DOD agrees to assist with commodity distribution in LA."³⁶⁶
- "The 13th [Corps Support Command] is en route to New Orleans."³⁶⁷
- "President Bush calls for another \$52 billion in aid to compliment the \$10.5 billion already approved by Congress."³⁶⁸
- "Senator Frist and Speaker Hastert announce their intention to conduct a bipartisan investigation at an event to which no Democrats were invited. Democratic congressional leaders say they will not take part in the panel as announced."³⁶⁹

Thursday, September 8, 2005:

- "Approximately 60 percent of New Orleans (Orleans Parish) remains under water."³⁷⁰
- "Twelve UH-60s are redeployed from the 2/4th Cavalry and 4th Infantry Division."³⁷¹
- "The 14th Combat Support Hospital arrives."³⁷²
- "Mortuary affairs operations begin."³⁷³
- "\$52 billion in aid approved by Congress."³⁷⁴

Friday, September 9, 2005:

- "Search-and-rescue teams begin a deliberate search in New Orleans."³⁷⁵
- "St. Charles and Jefferson (East Bank) Parishes are reported dry. Depths of flood waters remaining in New Orleans range as high as 15 feet. St. Bernard Parish has 7 feet of water throughout the developed areas of the parish."³⁷⁶

Appendix 1: Timeline

- "The MS Gulf coast is now accessible from the north and east and from eastern LA."³⁷⁷

- "The London Avenue and Inner Harbor Navigational Canal breaches are closed."³⁷⁸
- "Evacuation flights out of Louis Armstrong International Airport end. Some 26,000 people were evacuated through the airport."³⁷⁹

- "The 4th Infantry Division returns to TX to resume preparations to deploy to Iraq."³⁸⁰
0849: "The AP reports that Former Secretary of State Colin Powell, in a 20/20 interview to be aired later that night, criticizes the response at all levels of the government to Hurricane Katrina, saying 'When you look at those who weren't able to get out, it should have been a blinding flash of the obvious to everybody that when you order a mandatory evacuation, you can't expect everybody to evacuate on their own. These are people who don't have credit cards; only one in 10 families at that economic level in New Orleans have a car. So it wasn't a racial thing ? but poverty disproportionately affects African-Americans in this country. And it happened because they were poor.'"³⁸¹

Saturday, September 10, 2005:

- "Mississippi Power and Light Company reports that power has been restored to 90% of the customers able to receive power."³⁸²
- "The Department of Homeland Security designates VADM Thad Allen, USCG, as the principal Federal official in the affected states."³⁸³

Sunday, September 11, 2005

- "Oil production in the Gulf of Mexico is at 41% of its pre-Hurricane Katrina level and gas production is at 62%."³⁸⁴

Monday, September 12, 2005

- "Tropical Storm Ophelia threatens the east coast."³⁸⁵
- "Primary searches are complete in New Orleans."³⁸⁶
- "Search-and-rescue operations expand into outlying parishes."³⁸⁷
- "Air rescue missions end."³⁸⁸
- "The Secretary of Defense directs the deployment of nine mortuary affairs teams to LA."³⁸⁹
- "FEMA director Michael Brown, (aka "Brownie") resigns from FEMA. Bush names R. David Paulison as acting director of FEMA."³⁹⁰

Tuesday, September 13, 2005

- "Ophelia is designated a Category 1 hurricane."³⁹¹
- The 54th Quartermaster Company (Mortuary Affairs) arrives in New Orleans."³⁹²
- "Louis Armstrong International Airport opens for limited commercial flights."³⁹³
- "DOD forces complete the "hasty search-and-rescue" mission."³⁹⁴
- "Bush takes responsibility for the federal government's failures during the Hurricane Katrina relief effort."³⁹⁵
- "The owners of St. Rita's Nursing Home in New Orleans are charged with negligent homicide for the deaths of 34 patients who were not evacuated before the storm hit."³⁹⁶

Thursday, September 15, 2005

Appendix 1: Timeline

- "Mayor Nagin announces that businesses and residents will be allowed to return to the city beginning Monday, 19 September."³⁹⁷
- "Primary searches are complete in Orleans, Jefferson, and St. Bernard Parishes."³⁹⁸

Friday, September 16, 2005

- "MS begins the 38th Infantry Division 'force adjustment.'"³⁹⁹
- "AL redeploys 1,500 personnel."⁴⁰⁰
- "Plans are under development to transfer all Active component missions in LA to the National Guard no later than 29 September. All aviation missions will transition between 19 and 22 September."⁴⁰¹

Saturday, September 17, 2005⁴⁰²

- "GA National Guard units, 1,065 soldiers and airmen, plan to withdraw from MS on 20 September."⁴⁰³
- "The 82nd Airborne Division turns over all responsibilities for ESF #8 and ESF #13 at the Convention Center and Touro Hospital. The 82nd Airborne also relinquishes responsibility for logistics to FEMA."⁴⁰⁴

Sunday, September 18, 2005⁴⁰⁵

- "Tropical Depression 18 is redesignated as Tropical Storm Rita."⁴⁰⁶
- "Personnel begin secondary searches in New Orleans. The object is to reexamine all homes and buildings in areas subjected to at least 5.5 feet of flood water."⁴⁰⁷
- "The 2nd Brigade Combat Team/1st Cavalry Division returns to Fort Hood."⁴⁰⁸

Monday, September 19, 2005⁴⁰⁹

- "All TX National Guard and other responders are directed to return to TX to prepare for Hurricane Rita."⁴¹⁰
- "An Army veterinary team deploys to LA to assist with veterinary care."⁴¹¹
- "In a speech at Brown University, former presidential candidate John Kerry blasts Bush's recovery plan for the Gulf Coast region as a 'right-wing ideological experiment.'"⁴¹²
- "The AP reports that slightly more than \$1 billion has been raised for charities aiding families displaced by the disaster."⁴¹³

Tuesday, September 20, 2005⁴¹⁴

- "Hurricane Rita makes landfall in FL. Damage is minimal."⁴¹⁵
- "As Hurricane Rita gathers strength off the coast of Florida, Mayor Ray Nagin calls off his plan to allow residents to return to their homes in New Orleans, urging those who had come back to evacuate."⁴¹⁶

Wednesday, September 21, 2005⁴¹⁷

- "VADM Thad Allen, USCG, is designated as the Federal coordinating officer."⁴¹⁸
- "The President issues a Federal emergency declaration in anticipation of the damage by Hurricane Rita."⁴¹⁹

Thursday, September 22, 2005⁴²⁰

Appendix 1: Timeline

- "DOD establishes JTF *Rita* ahead of the storm under the command of LTG Robert Clark, Commanding General of US Fifth Army."⁴²¹

Saturday, September 24, 2005⁴²²

- "The US Army Corps of Engineers installs 60-foot sheets of steel piling to block Lake Pontchartrain's tidal surge from the 17th Street and London Avenue Canals."⁴²³

- "With Hurricane Rita threatening New Orleans, OK National Guard troops reposition their logistics operations troops, including food, supply, and maintenance troops, to the Morial Convention Center."⁴²⁴

Monday, September 26, 2005⁴²⁵

- "Secondary searches are about 75% complete in New Orleans. Authorities expect these searches to continue for another week."⁴²⁶

Tuesday, October 11, 2005: "All the floodwaters had been removed from the city of New Orleans."⁴²⁷

Appendix 1: Timeline

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Appendix 1: Timeline

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Appendix 1: Timeline

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²⁰⁶ TPM.
²⁰⁷ DeLozier.
²⁰⁸ Richard D. Knabb, Jamie R. Rhome, and Daniel P. Brown, 36.
²⁰⁹ DeLozier.
²¹⁰ Wombwell, 245.
²¹¹ Drye.
²¹² DeLozier.
²¹³ Wombwell, 245; Time from DeLozier.
²¹⁴ Drye.
²¹⁵ DeLozier.
²¹⁶ Drye.
²¹⁷ DeLozier.
²¹⁸ DeLozier.
²¹⁹ Richard D. Knabb, Jamie R. Rhome, and Daniel P. Brown, 3.
²²⁰ DeLozier.
²²¹ Wombwell, 245.
²²² Drye.
²²³ DeLozier.
²²⁴ DeLozier.
²²⁵ Drye.
²²⁶ Richard D. Knabb, Jamie R. Rhome, and Daniel P. Brown, 3.
²²⁷ Richard D. Knabb, Jamie R. Rhome, and Daniel P. Brown, 9.
²²⁸ Wombwell, 245.
²²⁹ Wombwell, 246.
²³⁰ Drye.
²³¹ Drye.
²³² TPM.
²³³ Drye.
²³⁴ TPM.
²³⁵ Drye.
²³⁶ TPM.
²³⁷ Drye.
²³⁸ DeLozier.
²³⁹ Drye.
²⁴⁰ DeLozier.
²⁴¹ Drye.
²⁴² DeLozier.
²⁴³ Drye.
²⁴⁴ Drye.
²⁴⁵ DeLozier.
²⁴⁶ DeLozier.
²⁴⁷ Wombwell, 246.

Appendix 1: Timeline

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- ²⁴⁸ Wombwell, 246.
²⁴⁹ Wombwell, 246.
²⁵⁰ DeLozier.
²⁵¹ DeLozier.
²⁵² Wombwell, 246.
²⁵³ Wombwell, 246.
²⁵⁴ Wombwell, 246.
²⁵⁵ DeLozier.
²⁵⁶ Richard D. Knabb, Jamie R. Rhome, and Daniel P. Brown, 4.
²⁵⁷ Drye.
²⁵⁸ DeLozier.
²⁵⁹ DeLozier.
²⁶⁰ DeLozier.
²⁶¹ DeLozier.
²⁶² DeLozier.
²⁶³ DeLozier.
²⁶⁴ TPM.
²⁶⁵ DeLozier.
²⁶⁶ Richard D. Knabb, Jamie R. Rhome, and Daniel P. Brown, 4.
²⁶⁷ Wombwell, 246.
²⁶⁸ Wombwell, 246.
²⁶⁹ DeLozier.
²⁷⁰ Wombwell, 246.
²⁷¹ Wombwell, 246-247.
²⁷² Wombwell, 247.
²⁷³ Wombwell, 247.
²⁷⁴ Drye.
²⁷⁵ DeLozier.
²⁷⁶ DeLozier.
²⁷⁷ DeLozier.
²⁷⁸ DeLozier.
²⁷⁹ DeLozier.
²⁸⁰ DeLozier.
²⁸¹ DeLozier.
²⁸² Wombwell, 246.
²⁸³ DeLozier.
²⁸⁴ Wombwell, 246.
²⁸⁵ DeLozier.
²⁸⁶ DeLozier.
²⁸⁷ Chris Buell, *New Orleans mayor declares "martial law," pulls police from rescues to halt looting*. Jurist Legal News & Research, <http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/paperchase/2005/08/update-new-orleans-mayor-declares.php> (accessed April 1, 2010).
²⁸⁸ TPM.
²⁸⁹ Wombwell, 247.
²⁹⁰ DeLozier.
²⁹¹ Wombwell, 247.
²⁹² Wombwell, 247.
²⁹³ DeLozier.
²⁹⁴ DeLozier.
²⁹⁵ DeLozier.
²⁹⁶ DeLozier.
²⁹⁷ DeLozier.
²⁹⁸ DeLozier.
²⁹⁹ Wombwell, 247.
³⁰⁰ Drye.

Appendix 1: Timeline

301 DeLozier.
302 Drye.
303 Wombwell, 247.
304 DeLozier.
305 Wombwell, 247.
306 Wombwell, 247.
307 Wombwell, 247.
308 Wombwell, 247.
309 Wombwell, 247.
310 Wombwell, 247.
311 Wombwell, 247.
312 DeLozier.
313 DeLozier.
314 TPM.
315 DeLozier.
316 TPM.
317 TPM.
318 DeLozier.
319 TPM.
320 Wombwell, 247.
321 Wombwell, 247.
322 Wombwell, 247.
323 Wombwell, 247.
324 Wombwell, 247.
325 Wombwell, 247.
326 Wombwell, 247.
327 Wombwell, 247.
328 DeLozier.
329 DeLozier.
330 DeLozier.
331 TPM..
332 TPM.
333 TPM..
334 Wombwell, 248.
335 Wombwell, 248.
336 DeLozier.
337 DeLozier.
338 DeLozier.
339 TPM..
340 TPM..
341 Wombwell, 248.
342 DeLozier.
343 Wombwell, 248.
344 Wombwell, 248.
345 Wombwell, 248.
346 Wombwell, 248.
347 Wombwell, 248.
348 DeLozier.
349 DeLozier.
350 DeLozier.
351 DeLozier.
352 DeLozier.
353 Wombwell, 248.
354 Wombwell, 248.
355 Wombwell, 248.

Appendix 1: Timeline

356 Wombwell, 248.
357 Wombwell, 248.
358 Wombwell, 248.
359 DeLozier.
360 DeLozier.
361 DeLozier.
362 DeLozier.
363 DeLozier.
364 Wombwell, 248.
365 Wombwell, 248.
366 Wombwell, 248.
367 Wombwell, 248.
368 DeLozier.
369 TPM..
370 Wombwell, 248.
371 Wombwell, 248.
372 Wombwell, 249.
373 Wombwell, 249.
374 DeLozier.
375 Wombwell, 249.
376 Wombwell, 249.
377 Wombwell, 249.
378 Wombwell, 249.
379 Wombwell, 249.
380 Wombwell, 249.
381 TPM.
382 Wombwell, 249.
383 Wombwell, 249.
384 Wombwell, 249.
385 Wombwell, 249.
386 Wombwell, 249.
387 Wombwell, 249.
388 Wombwell, 249.
389 Wombwell, 249.
390 TPM.
391 Wombwell, 249.
392 Wombwell, 249.
393 Wombwell, 249.
394 Wombwell, 249.
395 TPM.
396 TPM.
397 Wombwell, 250.
398 Wombwell, 250.
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401 Wombwell, 250.
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404 Wombwell, 250.
405 Wombwell, 250.
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407 Wombwell, 250.
408 Wombwell, 250.
409 Wombwell, 250.
410 Wombwell, 250.

Appendix 1: Timeline

- ⁴¹¹ Wombwell, 250.
- ⁴¹² TPM.
- ⁴¹³ TPM.
- ⁴¹⁴ Wombwell, 250.
- ⁴¹⁵ Wombwell, 250.
- ⁴¹⁶ TPM.
- ⁴¹⁷ Wombwell, 250.
- ⁴¹⁸ Wombwell, 250.
- ⁴¹⁹ Wombwell, 250.
- ⁴²⁰ Wombwell, 250.
- ⁴²¹ Wombwell, 250.
- ⁴²² Wombwell, 251.
- ⁴²³ Wombwell, 251.
- ⁴²⁴ Wombwell, 251.
- ⁴²⁵ Wombwell, 251.
- ⁴²⁶ Wombwell, 251.
- ⁴²⁷ Richard D. Knabb, Jamie R. Rhome, and Daniel P. Brown, 9.

Appendix 2: Figures 1-15 (Phase Progressions)

Buildup Phase Progression





Figure 1: Buildup Phase for Catastrophes

Appendix 2: Figures 1-15 (Phase Progressions)

Buildup Phase Progression




Los Angeles Riots of 1992

Figure 2: Buildup Phase Progression for the Los Angeles Riots of 1992

Appendix 2: Figures 1-15 (Phase Progressions)

Buildup Phase Progression



Hurricane Katrina in 2005

Figure 3: Buildup Phase Progression for Hurricane Katrina in 2005




Figure 4: Chaos Phase Progression for Catastrophes

Appendix 2: Figures 1-15 (Phase Progressions)





Figure 5: Chaos Phase Progression for the Los Angeles Riots of 1992

Appendix 2: Figures 1-15 (Phase Progressions)

Chaos Phase Progression



Hurricane Katrina in 2005

Figure 6: Chaos Phase Progression for Hurricane Katrina in 2005

Appendix 2: Figures 1-15 (Phase Progressions)





Figure 7: Reaction Phase Progression for Catastrophes

Appendix 2: Figures 1-15 (Phase Progressions)



Los Angeles Riots of 1992

Figure 8: Reaction Phase Progression for the Los Angeles Riots of 1992

Appendix 2: Figures 1-15 (Phase Progressions)






Figure 9: Reaction Phase Progression for Hurricane Katrina in 2005

Appendix 2: Figures 1-15 (Phase Progressions)



**Figure 10: Federal Planning Phase Progression
for Catastrophes**


Appendix 2: Figures 1-15 (Phase Progressions)



Los Angeles Riots of 1992

**Figure 11: Federal Planning Phase Progression
for the Los Angeles Riots of 1992**

Appendix 2: Figures 1-15 (Phase Progressions)



Hurricane Katrina in 2005

**Figure 12: Federal Planning Phase Progression
for Hurricane Katrina in 2005**

Appendix 2: Figures 1-15 (Phase Progressions)




Figure 13: National Response Phase Progression for Catastrophes

Appendix 2: Figures 1-15 (Phase Progressions)






Figure 14: National Response Phase Progression for the Los Angeles Riots of 1992

Appendix 2: Figures 1-15 (Phase Progressions)



**Figure 15: National Response Phase Progression
for Hurricane Katrina in 2005**

Appendix 3: Disaster Relief Fund, FY 1974-2005 (millions of dollars, adjusted to 2005 values)



Appendix 4: Statutory Exceptions to the Posse Comitatus Act¹

5 USC App (Inspector General Act of 1978) 8(g): Department of Defense Inspector General is not limited by the Posse Comitatus Act (18 USC 1385) in carrying out audits and investigations under the Act.

10 USC 331–335: President may use the militia and armed forces to suppress insurrection and enforce federal authority in the face of rebellion or other forms of domestic violence.

10 USC 374 note (§1004 of the National Defense Authorization Act for 1991, as amended): During fiscal years 1991 through 2002, the Secretary of Defense may provide counterdrug activity assistance on request of federal or state law enforcement agencies.

10 USC 382: The Secretary of Defense may provide assistance to the Department of Justice in emergency situations involving chemical or biological weapons of mass destruction.

10 USC 382 note (§1023 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000): During fiscal years 2000 through 2004, the Secretary of Defense may provide assistance to federal and state law enforcement agencies to respond to terrorism or threats of terrorism.

16 USC 23: Secretary of the Army may detail troops to protect Yellowstone National Park on the request of the Secretary of the Interior.

16 USC 78: Secretary of the Army may detail troops to protect Sequoia and Yosemite National Parks on the request of the Secretary of the Interior.

16 USC 593: President may use the land and naval forces of the United States to prevent destruction of federal timber in Florida.

16 USC 1861(a): Secretary of Transportation (or the Secretary of the Navy in time of war) may enter into agreements for the use of personnel and resources of other federal or state agencies—including those of the Department of Defense—for the enforcement of the Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Management Act.

18 USC 112, 1116: Attorney General may request the assistance of federal or state agencies—including the Army, Navy, and Air Force—to protect foreign dignitaries from assault, manslaughter, and murder.

18 USC 351: FBI may request the assistance of any federal or state agency—including the Army, Navy, and Air Force—in its investigations of the assassination, kidnapping, or assault of a member of Congress.

18 USC 831: Attorney General may request assistance from the Secretary of Defense for enforcement of the proscriptions against criminal transactions in nuclear materials (18 USC 175a, 229E, and 2332e cross reference to the Attorney General's authority under 10 USC 381 to request assistance from the Secretary in an emergency involving biological weapons, chemical weapons, and weapons of mass destruction, respectively).

18 USC 1751: FBI may request the assistance of any federal or state agency—including the Army, Navy, and Air Force—in its investigations of the assassination, kidnapping, or assault of the President.

18 USC 3056: Director of the Secret Service may request assistance from the Department of Defense and other federal agencies to protect the President.

22 USC 408: President may use the land and naval forces of the United States to enforce Title IV of the Espionage Act of 1917 (22 USC 401–408).

22 USC 461: President may use the land and naval forces and militia of the United States to seize or detain ships used in violation of the Neutrality Act.

22 USC 462: President may use the land and naval forces and militia of the United States to detain or compel departure of foreign ships under the provisions of the Neutrality Act.

25 USC 180: President may use military force to remove trespassers from Indian treaty lands.

42 USC 98: Secretary of the Navy at the request of the Public Health Service may make vessels or hulks available to quarantine authority at various US ports.

42 USC 1989: Magistrates issuing arrest warrants for civil rights violations may authorize those serving the warrants to call for assistance from bystanders, the posse comitatus, or the land or naval forces or militia of the United States.

42 USC 5170b: Governor of state in which a major disaster has occurred may request the President to direct the Secretary of Defense to permit the use of DOD personnel for emergency work necessary for the preservation of life and property.

43 USC 1065: President may use military force to remove unlawful enclosures from the public lands.

48 USC 1418: President may use the land and naval forces of the United States to protect the rights of owners in guano islands.

48 USC 1422: Governor of Guam may request assistance of senior military or naval commander of the armed forces of the United States in cases of disaster, invasion, insurrection, rebellion, or imminent danger thereof, or of lawless violence.

48 USC 1591: Governor of the Virgin Islands may request assistance of senior military or naval commander of the armed forces of the United States in the Virgin Islands or Puerto Rico in cases of disaster, invasion, insurrection, rebellion, or imminent danger thereof, or of lawless violence.

50 USC 220: President may use the Army, Navy, or militia to prevent the unlawful removal of vessels or cargoes from custom areas during times of insurrection.

ⁱ Taken directly from Matt Matthews, *The Posse Comitatus Act and the United States Army: A Historical Perspective*, Global War on Terrorism Occasional Paper 14 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2006), 81-83.